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INTRODUCTION
No single comprehensive set of multilateral rules currently exists for the regu-
lation of foreign direct investment.' At the World Trade Organization's ("WTO")
Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996, member country trade min-
isters advanced closer to the establishment of multilateral investment rules by
forming a WTO working group to study the relationship between trade and foreign
direct investment.' The regulation of foreign direct investment became part of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT') agenda during the Uruguay
Round with the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (" TRIMs").3
Developing countries, led by India, have resisted multilateral efforts to regulate
I. See A Level Playing Field for Foreign Direct Investment World-Wide: Communi-
cation from the Commission, COM(95)42 final at 4 [hereinafter European Commission
Proposal on FDI] (examining the current multilateral framework for FDI and concluding
that there are no comprehensive multilateral rules).
2. See World Trade Organization Secretariat, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, para.
20, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (adopted on 13 Dec. 1996) [hereinafter Singapore Declaration],
reprinted in Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Focus (World Trade Organization,
Geneva, Switzerland), Jan. 1997, at 7, 10. Concerning direct investment and the WTO
framework, the Ministers stated:
Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters related to investment and competition
policy and the built-in agenda in these areas, including under the [Trade-Related Investment
Measures] Agreement, and on the understanding that the work undertaken shall not prejudge
whether negotiations will be initiated in the future, we also agree to: establish a working group to
examine the relationship between trade and investment.... In the conduct of the work of the
working groups, we encourage cooperation with [the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development] to ... ensure that the development dimension is taken fully into account .... It is
clearly understood that future negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in these ar-
eas, will take place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO Members re-
garding such negotiations.
Id; see The Growing Impact of Investment and Trade, WTO Focus (World Trade Organi-
zation, Geneva, Switzerland), June-July 1997, at 2, 2 (highlighting the discussions of the
first meeting (June 2-3, 1997) of the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade
and Investment).
3. See infra Parts II.B.1-2 (discussing the GATS and TRIMs Agreements and their
provisions relating to foreign direct investment).
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direct investment4 because they view restrictive investment policy as a sovereign
right and an element of national economic policy.' They fear abuse by multina-
tional enterprises6 and a loss of sovereign control over national development if in-
vestment policies are liberalized.7
At the Singapore Ministerial Conference, the coalition of developing countries
opposed to an agreement on direct investment8 compromised enough9 to allow the
Ministerial Declaration to establish a WTO working group on direct investment."0
This developing country coalition, however, insists that the working group only
has authority to examine the possible broadening of the TRIMs Agreement, which
the Agreement itself mandates." India, in particular, insists that it will resist any
multilateral agreement on direct investment in the WTO.' The developed coun-
tries, on the other hand, envision the newly established working group leading to
discussions on a comprehensive agreement on direct investment.1
3
Current efforts in this direction outside of the VTO provide a useful negotiat-
ing foundation for developed countries.'4 In May of 1998,"s the member countries
4. See infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text (examining developing country
positions in the TRIMs negotiations); see also infra notes 287-292 and accompanying text
(discussing India's resistance to any future negotiations on direct investment in the ITO).
5. See discussion infra Parts I.C-D (describing developing country investment meas-
ures, the reasons for institution of these measures, and international law permitting such
measures).
6. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text (identifying the potential "costs" to
developing country economies from the practices of multinational enterprises).
7. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text (describing the use of investment
measures to harness FDI toward development objectives).
8. See infra note 282 (describing the formation and later collapse of the developing
country coalition opposed to a WTO agreement on investment).
9. See C. Rammanohar Rheddy, A Familiar Story at WTO Meet, HnDu, Dec. 14,
1996, at 13 (suggesting that developed countries at the Singapore Conference ignored the
legitimate concerns of developing countries on the investment issue). "[A] II the compro-
mise language on the new issues cannot hide the fact that the developing countries came to
Singapore not wanting any reference to these issues in the ministerial declaration." Id
10. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, para. 20 (establishing a
working group on trade and investment).
11. See infra notes 194-196 and accompanying text (discussing the built-in authority
for review of the TRIMs and GATS Agreements allowing the possibility to expand the
WTO's coverage of direct investment).
12. See infra notes 287-292 and accompanying text (discussing India's stance toward
investment on the WTO agenda).
13. See infra notes 285-286 and accompanying text (discussing the desire of developed
countries to pursue an agreement on direct investment in the WTO); see also infra notes
293-298 (describing how developed countries can induce developing countries into agree-
ing to investment negotiations).
14. The EU desires that the forthcoming MAI serve as a foundation for a WTO agree-
ment on direct investment. In the May 1997 draft of the MA!, the EU inserted language to
this effect. See May 1997 M4l Draft, infra note 17, preamble ("Wishing that this Agree-
ment enhances international co-operation with respect to investment and the development
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of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"),
largely a developed country organization, 6 intend to complete negotiations on a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI" ).17 The MAI will be a freestanding
international treaty and will become the most comprehensive multilateral invest-
ment agreement in existence. 8 It will likely become the benchmark for negotia-
tions in the WTO.9
This Comment analyzes the framework for negotiations in the WTO for an
agreement on direct investment and the conflicting interests of developed and de-
veloping countries regarding such an agreement. Part I introduces the concepts of
foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises and discusses the various
measures taken by developing countries to control direct investment in their
economies. Part II examines the regulation of foreign direct investment in the in-
ternational economic system, from the stillborn International Trade Organization
through the Uruguay Round Agreements. Part III analyzes the forthcoming OECD
Multilateral Agreement on Investment and assesses its benefits and limitations. Fi-
nally, part IV of this Comment describes the setting for negotiations on foreign di-
rect investment in the WTO, discusses important issues for these negotiations, and
provides recommendations as to the substance of WTO negotiations. This Com-
ment concludes by recommending that negotiators pursue a gradual and balanced
track of investment liberalization that adequately reflects the concerns of devel-
oping countries.
of world-wide rules on foreign direct investment in the framework of the world trading
system as embodied in the World Trade Organization.").
15. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Report by the Negotiating Group,
OECD Doc., annex (May 21, 1997) [hereinafter MAI May 1997 Report] (resolving to com-
plete the MAI before the 1998 OECD Ministerial Meeting).
16. See note 205 (listing the membership of the OECD).
17. See infra Part III (analyzing the origins and likely provisions of the OECD MAI);
Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Consolidated Text and Commentary, Negotiating
Group on the MAI, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Org. for Econ.
Cooperation and Dev., OECD Doc. DAFFE/MAI(97)1I/REV2 (May 14, 1997) [hereinafter
May 1997 MAI Draft]; Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Consolidated Text and
Commentary, Negotiating Group on the MAI, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enter-
prise Affairs, Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., OECD Doc. DAFFE/MAI(96)16/REVI
(Jan. 13, 1997) [hereinafter January 1997 MAI Draft]. The OECD will distribute the draft
text of the MAI to interested non-governmental organizations. It can also be retrieved at
<http://www.citizen.org/gtw/mainewte.htm>.
18. See infra notes 268-272 and accompanying text (analyzing the benefits of the
MAI).
19. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the possible reconstitution of the MAI in the
WTO); supra note 14 (noting the EU's insertion of language in the May 1997 MAI Draft
with this objective in mind).
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I. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES, AND HOST COUNTRY INVESTMENT MEASURES
A. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
The WTO Secretariat defines foreign direct investment ("FDI") as occurring
"when an investor based in one country (the home country) acquires an asset in
another country (the host country) with the intent to manage that asset."'  World-
wide inflows of foreign direct investment are growing at a considerable rate." In
1995 total FDI inflows amounted to $315 billion," an increase of forty per cent
over 1994 Inflows to developing countries reached an all-time high of $100 bil-
lion in 1995.24 FDI is growing faster than both world trade and world outputo
20. World Trade Organization Secretariat, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment,
PRESSI57, at 6 (Oct. 9, 1996) [hereinafter JPTO Report] (stressing that the management of
the asset is what distinguishes direct investment from portfolio investment in stocks and
other financial instruments), reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIION, ANNUAL REPORT
ch. 4 (1996); see also INTERNATiONAL MONETARY FuND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANuAL,
para. 408, at 136 (4th ed. 1977) (providing a commonly cited definition of FDI as "invest-
ment that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy
other than that of an investor, the investor's purpose being to have an effective voice in the
management of the enterprise"), quoted in IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF
FOREIGN INvEmENr. THE WORLD BANK GumELINEs 1 n.3 (1993); Edward M. Graham,
Direct Investment and the Future Agenda of the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD
TRADING SYsTm: CHALLENGES AHEAD 205, 209 n.9 (distinguishing direct investment from
portfolio investment as "active" as opposed to "passive" investment). See generally M.
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVEMENT 4-8 (1994) (offering a
succinct exposition on the various definitions of foreign direct investment and distinguish-
ing it from other forms of investment).
21. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEv., WORLD INvEsmiENT REPORT 1996:
INvESmENT, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL PotucY ARRANGe.MENS at 3, U.N. Sales No.
E.96.I.A.14 (1996) [hereinafter UNCTAD 1996 REPORT].
22. See id
23. See id (figuring an increase of total FDI inflows from $226 billion in 1994 to $315
billion in 1995).
24. See id at 3, 4 tbl. 1.1 (indicating an increase in FDI inflows to developing countries
from $87 billion in 1994 to $99.7 billion in 1995).
25. See id at 3 (calculating the growth in exports of goods and nonfactor services at
18% in 1995 compared to a40% growth in FDI inflows); cfi Director General of the World
Trade Organization Renato Ruggiero, Address Before the Argentinean Council on Foreign
Relations (Sept. 10, 1996) (transcript available from the WVTO Secretariat as PRESS/55)
(commenting that foreign investment has become a "necessary precondition" to trade
where it was once viewed as a substitute for trade). Trade and foreign investment are "part
of a seamless web of international economic activity." Id But cf IfTO Report, supra note
20, at 7 (admitting that FDI grew faster than trade in 1995, but noting that in the period
1990-1994 the rate of FDI growth was smaller than that of trade because of a worldwide
recession).
26. See UNCTAD 1996 REPORT, supra note 21, at 3 (computing the growth in world
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There are a variety of reasons why a multinational enterprise ("MNE")27 un-
dertakes FDI. An MNE may undertake FDI in a host developing country to en-
hance product competitiveness in the host country's market through "tariff-
jumping" FDI,2" utilize cheaper labor for production facilities,29 secure a supply of
natural resources, 0 take advantage of a host country's investment incentives,3' and
for a number of other reasons.32 Each of these motivations for undertaking foreign
investment is ultimately based on the search for increased profits.3
Some argue that there is an "inherent conflict"'34 between the MNE and the host
country interests. The MNE seeks opportunities where the production costs are
lowest and sales where the prices are highest, resulting in repatriation of profits to
the home country.3" The host country, on the other hand, seeks to maximize bene-
fits to its economy, which requires the retention of MNE profits within the host
economy.36
output at 2.4% in 1995 compared to a 40% growth in FDI inflows).
27. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Toward a New Treaty Framework for Direct Foreign In-
vestment, 50 J. Anm. L. & COM. 969, 970 (1985) (defining an MNE as "a corporation or
group of corporations with headquarters in one country and production and marketing fa-
cilities in one or more other countries and which, in varying degrees, pursues a transna-
tional, rather than a purely national, strategy in conducting its operations").
28. See Oliver Morrissey & Yogesh Rai, The GA77 Agreement on Trade Related In-
vestment Measures: Implications for Developing Countries and Their Relationship with
Transnational Corporations, 31 J. DEv. STUD. 702, 705 (1995) (defining "tariff-jumping"
FDI as the use of direct investment as a vehicle to produce within the country and thereby
avoid protectionist tariff levels on the product).
29. See Robert Pritchard, Introduction: The Contemporary Challenges of Economic
Development, to EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW: ISSUES OF PRIVATE
SECTOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT, FOREIGN INvEsTmENT AND THE RULE OF LAW IN A NEW ERA
1, 5 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996).
30. See id.
31. See Morrissey & Rai, supra note 28, at 705; see also infra note 83 (offering several
sources that discuss host country investment incentives in some detail).
32. See, e.g., WTO Report, supra note 20, at 14 (suggesting that an MNE can realize
greater profits by 1) diversifying the location of its production and 2) "internalizing" the
use of its property assets, such as intellectual property, in a host country rather than simply
licensing the asset to a host country firm).
33. For a review of the theory of MNE investment in developing countries see gener-
ally ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CoRPoRATIoN: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INvESTMENT (1975) and Theodore H. Moran, Multinational
Corporations and the Developing Countries: An Analytical Overview, in MULTINATONAL
CORPORATIONS: THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DmEcr INVESTMENT I (Theodore H.
Moran ed., 1985).
34. Paul M. Goldberg & Charles P. Kindleberger, Toward a GA7Tfor Investment: A
Proposal for Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 295,
296 (1970) (noting inherent conflict between objectives of the international corporation and
the State).
35. See id. (noting that corporations seek to take advantage of variations in costs, taxes,
and markets).
36. See id. (describing the host country interest as seeking investment circumstances
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B. POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FDI TO HOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Despite the conflicting interests of MNEs and host countries, ME investment
can deliver benefits to the host developing country, 7 although potential benefits
depend, in part, on the nature of the FDI undertaken and the economic condition of
the country. 8 Host country benefits may include: 9 the injection of needed capital;
the introduction, transfer, or spillover of technology;" the introduction of sophisti-
cated management skills; increased host country employmen; 4' increased compe-
tition in the host country market; increased foreign exchange earnings through
M exports;42 and other benefits.43 Notwithstanding the potential of FDI to assist
where the MNE's contribution to the host gross national product, e.g. through local manu-
facture and export, minus the repatriation of MNE earnings is maximized).
37. See Resolution on International Investment for Economic Development, Mar. 4,
1955, GAIT B.I.S.D. (3d Supp.) at 49-50 (1955) [hereinafter Resolution on Investment]
(recognizing that FDI can assist developing countries by injecting needed capital and tech-
nology into the developing economy); see also Graham, supra note 20, at 206 (arguing that
the "benefits of FDI and related activities are almost without dispute").
38. See Salacuse, supra note 27, at 976 (noting that benefits can include increased for-
eign exchange, increased employment, and an increased tax base.); see also IP-7O Report,
supra note 20, at 28 (submitting that the benefits of FDI to a host economy are conditioned,
in part, on the host economy's competitive condition, level of investment in fixed capital
and education, and level of restrictions imposed on MNEs).
39. See, e.g., SHiHATA, supra note 20, at 11 (outlining potential benefits of FDI to host
economies); Michael A. Geist, Toward a General Agreement on the Regulation of Foreign
Direct Investment, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 673, 679 (1995) (noting the introduction of
new technologies, management skills, capital, and the creation of new jobs); Graham, supra
note 20, at 206; Salacuse, supra note 27, at 976; Jargen Voss, The Protection and Promo-
tion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Interests, Interdependencies.
Intricacies, 31 I'L & CoMP. L.Q. 686, 688 (1982).
40. See WTO Report, supra note 20, at 25-28 (defining technology broadly to include
scientific, managerial, and marketing expertise and suggesting that FDI results in higher
productivity in the targeted host country sector as a consequence of the introduction, trans-
fer, or spillover of technology). But cf Ari Kokko, Technology, Market Characteristics,
and Spillovers, 43 J. DEV. ECoN. 279, 290-91 (1994) (concluding that the level or benefit of
technology spillovers to a host economy is reduced when the FDI is undertaken in a sector
in which local technology is relatively unsophisticated). Technology spillovers are reduced
when FDI is undertaken in a sector that can be dominated by the greater productivity and
market share of an MNE. See id Kokko suggests that developing countries that want to
maximize technology spillover should channel technology-rich FDI into sectors where local
technology is already relatively strong or into sectors where economies of scale are not as
important to efficient production. See id
41. See WTO Report, supra note 20, at 29-30 (examining the empirical evidence of the
effect of FDI on host country employment and concluding that while the net effect may be
positive, the practices of MNEs and the skills of the local labor pool can influence the net
effect).
42. But see infra notes 47, 51-53 and accompanying text (noting that MNEs may dras-
tically limit any foreign exchange benefits through transfer pricing and other restrictive
business practices).
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development efforts in a host economy and deliver certain benefits or transfers to
the economy, MNE investment can also negatively affect the host economy and
profoundly disrupt the host country's development policies. Most developing
countries, consequently, view MNE investment as a "mixed blessing"" of poten-
tial benefits and potential costs.
The potential costs of MNE investment are numerous. MNE control or domina-
tion of host country sectors45 can significantly interfere with host country social
and economic reforms.46 The repatriation of MNE profits to the parent company in
the home State depletes host country foreign exchange reserves. 7 The NINE may
also introduce environmentally destructive or hazardous technologies into the host
country.48
A range of MNE practices known as restrictive business practices4 9 can also
significantly negate the value of FDI to a developing host economy. Parent com-
pany restrictions on subsidiary licensing of technology" and tied selling restric-
tions5 are common MNE practices that reduce the ultimate value of the FDI to the
43. See, e.g., SH-IATA, supra note 20, at 11 (suggesting that another benefit is greater
access to information and credit through the affiliation with the MNE); Geist, supra note
39, at 679 (considering another benefit the fact that foreign investors frequently lobby their
home government for more "favorable policies toward the host state in order to protect
their investment"); Salacuse, supra note 27, at 976 (citing an increased tax base as a benefit
to the host State).
44. See Salacuse, supra note 27, at 975-76 (arguing that "few, if any, host countries
consider foreign investment, in and of itself, as a good thing"). Rather, Salacuse suggests
that developing countries consider FDI desirable only if it promises tangible benefits to the
host economy. See id.
45. See id.; Voss, supra note 39, at 692 (positing that MNE control over host country
industry is "seen as an instrument for perpetuating the economic dependence of the Third
World"); see also Peter Hansen & Victoria Aranda, An Emerging International Framework
for Transnational Corporations, 14 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 881, 885 (1990/1991) (noting that
several decades ago many developing countries viewed FDI from their colonial rulers as a
threat to newfound political independence).
46. See A. Cristiana Baez, Should Investment in the Third World be Internationally
Protected? What Role for the United Nations?, 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 378, 390
(1987) (remarks by Samuel K.B. Asante).
47. See Voss, supra note 39, at 689.
48. See Salacuse, supra note 27, at 977 (referencing the Union Carbide chemical plant
gas leak in Bhopal, India which killed thousands); see also Sudhir K. Chopra, Multinational
Corporations in the Aftermath of Bhopal: The Need for a New Comprehensive Global Re-
gime for Transnational Corporate Activity, 29 VAL. U.L. REv. 235 (1994) (calling for an
international legal regime to ensure that MNE technology employed in host countries is
non-hazardous).
49. See UNCTAD 1996 REPORT, supra note 22, at 185 (defining "restrictive business
practices" as "anti-competitive practices by enterprises, that aim at monopolizing markets,
creating or abusing a dominant position of market power, or both").
50. See Paul Bryan Christy III, Negotiating Investment in the GATT: A Call for Func-
tionalism, 12 MICH. J. INT'LL. 743, 786 (1991).
51. See Morrissey & Rai, supra note 28, at 706 (defining "tied selling" as parent com-
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local economy. Transfer pricing52 is another common restrictive business practice.
In transfer pricing arrangements, the MNE parent and subsidiary sell inputs or out-
puts between each other at distorted market prices, affecting host country balance
of payments53
C. HOST COUNTRY INVESTMENT MEASURES
Most developing countries today subscribe to the view that in spite of the po-
tential negative effects of FDI on host country economies, the potential economic
benefits of FDI render the investment desirable as long as the potential FDI costs
are controlled and the FDI is "properly harnessed."' To this end, developing
countries subject inward FDI to various investment measures and performance re-
quirements.5 These FDI measures are important elements of host country eco-
nomic and industrial policy, 6 and host countries design them to minimize the po-
tential costs of the investment and to integrate the investment with development
goals' to achieve certain standards of development. 8 By giving the host country a
greater scope of control over the investment,59 investment measures help ensure
"credible commitments" by INEs in terms of the promised benefits to the host
economy.' From the perspective of the host country, investment measures repre-
pany restrictions on the parties with whom the host country subsidiary can trade). Tied
selling can limit a subsidiary's export abilities, and, further, the parent may limit a subsidi-
ary's ability to source locally and may stipulate that the subsidiary import production inputs
from the parent company. See idL
52 See id (describing "transfer pricing" as the practice of a parent MNE selling to its
subsidiary at an above-market price-thus increasing subsidiary expenses and reducing lo-
cal taxes--and requiring the subsidiary to sell its output to the parent at below-market
prices-thereby reducing host country export revenue). See generally UNCTAD 1996
REPORT, supra note 22, at 186 (discussing transfer pricing and host country fiscal con-
cerns).
53. See Baez, supra note 46, at 390.
54. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 38-50, 94 (characterizing this stance toward
FDI as the "middle path" theory, falling in between the "classical theory," which views all
FDI as desirable, and the "dependency theory," which views all FDI as harmful).
55. See infra notes 63-85 and accompanying text (discussing examples of typical in-
vestment measures and performance requirements).
56. See Rachel MeCulloch, Investment Policies in the GA7T, 13 WORLD ECON. 541,
545 (1990) (noting various types of national investment policies).
57. See Voss, supra note 39, at 686-87, 689 (discussing the harnessing of benefits from
the MNE-host country relationship to serve development goals).
58. See Edmund M.A. Kwaw, Trade Related Investment Measures in the Uruguay
Round: Towards a GA7T for Investment, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 309, 309, 319
(1991).
59. See SORNARAEAH, supra note 20, at 89 (asserting that FDI regulations "aim to sub-
ject the process of foreign investment to the administrative control of the host state").
60. See David Greenaway, Trade Related Investment Measures: Political Economy As-
pects and Issues for GA7T, 13 WORLD EcoN. 367, 373 (1990) (positing that investment
measures help lock-in desired benefits for the host economy, including increased employ-
ment and increased foreign exchange earnings).
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sent a countervailing power to the power of the MNE.6' In contrast, the MNE may
view host country investment measures as a quidpro quo for the right to invest.6"
Host country investment measures, other than expropriation and other property-
affecting measures, 63 fall into two general categories:'" entry restrictions and op-
erational requirements. Host countries usually impose both types of restrictions on
an investment at entry.65 In this way, hosts can condition entry on the acceptance
of specific operational requirements.'
At the entry stage, a host country's administrative agency screens the FDI pro-
posal based on the proposal's general suitability to the host's development objec-
tives and the level or likelihood of its expected benefits.67 The host may restrict
entry to those investments that satisfy certain government objectives," such as lo-
cating in a particular region of the country, engaging in a particular high-priority
sector, or undertaking a particular type of direct investment, such as a joint venture
with local partners.69 The host government denies entry to proposals that do not
satisfy the government's criteria.
61. See Morrissey & Rai, supra note 28, at 704; cf infra Part I.D (discussing interna-
tional law principles on host FDI restrictions and concluding that, unless limited by treaty, a
sovereign State has an unlimited right to control or condition entry).
62. See Patrick Low & Arvind Subramanian, TRIMs in the Uruguay Round: An Unfin-
ished Business, in THE URUGUAY RouND & TaB DEVELOPING ECONOMmS 413, 418 (Will
Martin & L. Alan Winters eds.) (World Bank Discussion Papers No. 307, 1995); see also
Keith E. Maskus & Denise R. Eby, Developing New Rules and Disciplines on Trade-
Related Investment Measures, 13 WORLD ECON. 523, 524 (1990) (contending that the pri-
mary motivation for investment measures is to secure local "rents" from the FDI); Morris-
sey & Rai, supra note 28, at 704 (asserting that FDI will only be undertaken if the MNE
foresees gains from the investment and investment measures are a means for hosts to ensure
reciprocal gains for the host country).
63. This Comment will not address property-affecting measures, e.g. expropriation, in
detail because international regulations and standards for these controls are generally ac-
ceptable to developing countries and, therefore, not a likely contested issue in future WTO
negotiations except as to the amount of compensation. See UNCTAD 1996 REPORT, supra
note 21, at 191 (suggesting that issues of expropriation in international agreements essen-
tially only raise the question of the amount of adequate compensation). See generally
SORNARAJAH-, supra note 20, at 95-98 (examining host country property rights guarantees,
their effects, and international law principles).
64. See Salacuse, supra note 27, at 979-80 (employing a similar categorization of host
controls).
65. See id. at 981 (examining the approval process).
66. See Kwaw, supra note 58, at 318 (discussing specific operational requirements of
host countries).
67. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 100-02 (discussing the role of host country ad-
ministrative agencies).
68. See id. at 102 (noting these screening criteria and offering some rationalizations for
excluding investment); see also Christy, supra note 50, at 748 (identifying common estab-
lishment restrictions).
69. See Salacuse, supra note 27, at 980-82 (outlining entry controls).
1024 12:6
FOREIGN DIRECTIN VESTMEATTAND THE WTO
If, however, the host government determines that the proposal contributes to the
government's development goals it may, at this stage, impose certain operational
restrictions on the direct investment before allowing entry. The range of opera-
tional restrictions, also known as performance requirements, is broad,7" and the
choice of restriction imposed depends upon the particular objectives of the host
country."' Common operational restrictions include:' local content restrictions,'
trade balancing requirements,7 4 export performance requirements," limitations on
imports, 6 foreign exchange and remittance restrictions,' minimum local equity
restrictions,' technology transfer requirements," local employment require-
ments,80 personnel entry restrictions,8 and product licensing requirements.'
70. But see discussion infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing the TRIMs Agreement). Certain in-
vestment measures-namely local content restrictions, trade balancing requirements, ex-
port; and import controls--were proscribed under the Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement ("TRIMs") of the Uruguay Round negotiations. See id
71. See Christy, supra note 50, at 748 (noting that economic, health, and political ob-
jectives influence the choice of operational restrictions).
72- See, e.g., Christy, supra note 50, at 779-80 (presenting an extensive list of invest-
ment measures discussed during the Uruguay Round TRIMs negotiations); Greenawiay, su-
pra note 60, at 368-72 (inventorying host investment measures); Joel NV. Messing, Towards
a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, TRANSNAT'L CORP., Apr. 1997, at 123, 124 n.3
(listing various categories of host country investment obstacles); UNCTAD 1996 REPORT,
supra note 21, at 174-79 (discussing and comprehensively identifying operational meas-
ures). But cf infra notes 168-173 and accompanying text (identifying investment measures
prohibited by the TRIMs Agreement).
73. See Morrissey & Rai, supra note 28, at 708 (defining "local content restrictions" as
measures requiring that a certain percentage value of inputs be locally sourced).
74. See Kwaw, supra note 58, at 319 (defining "trade balancing requirements" as re-
quirements obliging an investor to offset imports of materials with an equal value of prod-
uct exports).
75. See id (describing "export performance requirements" as stipulating that the NINE
apportion a certain amount of output for export, often more than the NINE would export
without the restriction).
76. See C. Fred Bergsten & Edward M. Graham, Needed: New International Rules for
Foreign Direct Investment, 7 INT'L TRADE J. 15, 27 (1992) (recognizing that host countries
discourage imports in favor of exports in order to maximize their trade balances); cf Kwmaw,
supra note 58, at 321 (noting that MNE production in a foreign country significantly affects
the trade balances of both host and home countries because a major component of NINE
trade is intrafirm trade).
77. See Christy, supra note 50, at 748 (commenting that restrictions on repatriation of
earnings and general foreign exchange restrictions seek to improve the host's balance of
payments condition).
78. See Greenaway, supra note 60, at 370 (asserting that local equity restrictions are
designed to partly "indigenise" the MNE operation).
79. See Kwaw, supra note 58, at 320 (noting that technology transfer requirements of-
ten obligate the MNE to license the technology to local partners).
80. See Bergsten & Graham, supra note 76, at 26 (describing the host country's need to
protect and promote local employment).
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Nearly every developing country desires FDI.83 Allowing FDI without condi-
tions, however, exposes the country to the potential abuses of MNEs and an ineq-
uitable distribution of benefits." The employment of each of these operational re-
quirements is designed to control the potential abuses of MNEs and to harness the
potential benefits of the MNE investment to serve the development goals of the
host country.85
D. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INVESTMENT MEASURES
FDI penetrates deep into the fibers of an economy and has a lasting effect on a
host nation.86 Host countries, accordingly, seek to regulate the scope and conse-
quences of FDI penetration through the institution of various investment meas-
uresY A host country's right to regulate inward FDI is a right that emanates from
its sovereignty and is based on the State's right to control the entry of aliens.8"
States have the sovereign right to regulate the entry or establishment of FDI and to
determine the role that FDI will play under the State's development policy. 9 In-
81. See Christy, supra note 50, at 748 (defining "personnel entry restrictions" as
measures limiting the ability of MNEs to employ expatriates in the host country operation).
82. See Greenaway, supra note 60, at 371 (describing "product licensing require-
ments" as requirements obliging the MNE to license production in the host country, re-
ducing potential MNE profits).
83. Cf Graham, supra note 20, at 213-14 & n.14 (discussing various incentives offered
by host countries to attract investment and how this leads to a "prisoner's dilemma" among
countries); cf also Kwaw, supra note 58, at 310 (relating the carrot (incentives) and stick
(investment restrictions) approach to host country investment regulation). This Comment
will not discuss host country incentives in detail, but for a good review of incentives see
generally U.N. Div. ON TRANSNATIONAL CORP. AND INv., U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE &
DEV., INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTCI/28, U.N.
Sales No. E.96.II.A.6 (1996) and Robin W. Broadway & Anwar Shah, Perspectives on the
Role of Investment Incentives in Developing Countries, in FISCAL INCENIVES FOR
INvESTMENT AND INNOvATION 31 (Anwar Shah ed., 1995).
84. Cf McCulloch, supra note 56, at 541 (claiming that although nearly every country
seeks to attract FDI, most limit or restrict MNE investment).
85. See Maskus & Eby, supra note 62, at 524-25 (discussing the purpose of operational
requirements).
86. See Hansen & Aranda, supra note 45, at 882 (claiming that FDI "presuppose[s] a
long-term relationship with that country").
87. See supra Part I.C (discussing the range of host country investment measures ap-
plied to the entry and operation of FDI).
88. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 83 (noting that the right of a State to control
FDI is based on the international law regarding aliens); A.A. Fatouros, Towards an Inter-
national Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment?, 10 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 18 1,
193 (1995) (stating that "[s]tates are free to allow or prohibit the entry of aliens in their ter-
ritory and the establishment in it of aliens in general, including traders and foreign inves-
tors"). The MNE voluntarily subjects itself to the laws of the host State by entering the ju-
risdiction of the host State. See SORNARAJAH, supra, at 83.
89. See Hansen & Aranda, supra note 45, at 884 (claiming that this is "the position of
classic customary international law"); see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 100 (assert-
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vestment measures for controlling or harnessing the penetration of FDI, therefore,
are a principal sovereign right"
The principles of a liberal international economic system, however, directly
conflict with the principle of unlimited sovereign control over FD. 9' Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, the development of international law restricting a State's control
over FDI has been gradual. 2 A State, however, may voluntarily constrain or qual-
ify its sovereign ability to control FDI by participating in an international treaty
that specifically limits the State's rights.93 In fact, most of the current liberalization
of host investment measures is the result of a plenitude of bilateral investment
treaties Negotiations in the Uruguay Round attempted to establish a foundation
for a set of multilateral rules limiting a host country's control of FDI The devel-
ing that a State may deny entry to foreign investment that it deems detrimental to its devel-
opment interests). But cf Kwaw, supra note 58, at 310 n.4 (explaining that certain custom-
ary international law principles restrict the host's unlimited control over FDI after the in-
vestment is made). International law principles such as minimum international standards,
pacta sunt servanda, acquired rights, and expropriation standards restrict a host country's
ability to control FDI once it has entered the economy. See i d
90. See McCulloch, supra note 56, at 541 (asserting that investment measures are a
"core issue in terms of national sovereignty"); see also Salacuse, supra note 27, at 980.
Salacuse argues:
It is well settled in international law that the host state has the right to control the movement of
capital into its territory, to regulate all matters pertaining to the acquisition and transfer of prop-
erty within its national boundaries, to determine the conditions for the exercise of cconomic ac-
tivity by natural or legal persons, and to control the entry and activity of aliens, [including
MvNEs].
Id
91. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 85 (noting the conflict between the two).
92. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3 (Feb.
5). The International Court of Justice reasoned:
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the growvth of foreign invest-
ments and the expansion of the international activities of corporations... and considering the
way in which the economic interests of States have proliferated, it may at first sight appear sur-
prising that the evolution of law has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the
matter have crystallized on the international plane.
Id at 46-47; see also Geist, supra note 39, at 675 (stating that chapter 3, article 12, para-
graph 1 of the Havana Charter for the International Trade Organization recognized a host
country's sovereign right to regulate FDI).
93. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 90 (explaining how an international treaty can
limit a State's sovereignty over a domestic matter); see also Hansen & Aranda, supra note
45, at 885 (recognizing that developing countries may also unilaterally limit their control
over FDI).
94. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 20, at 86 (discussing the results of bilateral invest-
ment treaties). See generally Todd S. Shenkin, Comment, Trade-Related Investment Meas-
ures in Bilateral Investment Treaties and the GATT Moving Toward a Multilateral Invest-
ment Treaty, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 541 (1994) (examining various BITs and calling for a
multilateral investment treaty). But cf Geist, supra note 39, at 685 (noting that "the general
unwillingness of BITs to encroach upon established national lawv may be one explanation
for the fact that they have not been found to significantly affect investment flows").
95. See infra Parts lI.B.1-2 (discussing the Uruguay Round GATS and TRIMs Agree-
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opment of a comprehensive multilateral set of rules for FDI, however, is still in its
early stages.'
II. THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
THE GATT FRAMEWORK
A. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION AND PRE-URUGUAY ROUND GATT
1. International Trade Organization
The jurisdiction of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (" GATT')97
did not include the regulation of FDI until the Uruguay Round.9 The early-
proposed embodiment of GATT, the International Trade Organization ("ITO"),"
did, however, cover issues of foreign direct investment. Articles 11 and 12 of
Chapter III of the ITO Charter contained the primary provisions relating to FDI.'
The ITO investment provisions, however, were not demanding in their liberaliza-
tion requirements.'" They required only that States "give due regard to the desir-
ability of avoiding discrimination as between foreign investments." 02 There was
no obligation for national treatment or right of establishment in the ITO provi-
sions, and the provisions did not cover investment incentives or performance re-
ments that deal with aspects of host country FDI regulation).
96. See infra notes 180-187 (examining the shortcomings of the Uruguay Round's
TRIMs Agreement).
97. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
98. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Meas-
ures (" TRIMs") and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (" GATS"), which both
regulate aspects of foreign direct investment).
99. Charter for the International Trade Organization, Final Act and Related Documents,
U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948) [here-
inafter ITO Charter]; see JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 12 (1990)
(positing that the ITO died stillborn because the United States, its chief supporter, did not
ratify it). The ITO was to become the third pillar of the world economic system along with
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. See id. at 10. GATT was simply a
treaty that was instituted to solidify tariff reductions prior to the establishment of the ITO,
and GATT was to become part of a member State's obligations under the ITO. See id. at 10,
12. Because the ITO never came into existence, GATT continued on in its original treaty
form. See id. at 15.
100. See ITO Charter, supra note 99, ch. III, arts. 11, 12. Article II Is entitled "Means
of Promoting Economic Development and Reconstruction." Article 12 is entitled "Interna-
tional Investment for Economic Development and Reconstruction." See also Christy, supra
note 50, at 773-76 (discussing the negotiations over investment provisions for the ITO
Charter).
101. See EDWARD M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL GOvERNMENTS
70 (1996) (noting that the ITO investment provisions were "rather weak").
102. ITO Charter, supra note 99, ch. III, art. 12, para. 2(a)(ii).
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quirements.0 3 Essentially, the ITO investment provisions only codified interna-
tional law principles regarding the sovereign right of States"' to restrict the entry
of FDI into their territories." 5 The failure of the ITO was, in part, related to its in-
vestment provisions.' Developing countries considered them too protective of
MNEs, and developed countries considered them too protective of host coun-
tries. 7 Nevertheless, because the ITO never came into being and only the trade-
oriented GATT remained,' the initial GATT framework did not cover investment
issues.I" 9
2. FIRA Dispute
GATT's first real foray"' into investment issues came in a 1982 dispute
brought by the United States against Canada"' alleging that Canada's administra-
tion of its Foreign Investment Review Act ("FIRA")" 2 violated GATT obliga-
103. See GRAHAM, supra note 101, at 70 (noting the absence of investment provisions in
the ITO Charter covering certain direct investment regulatory issues).
104. See supra Part I.D (discussing the international law right of States regarding re-
strictions on the entry and treatment of FDI).
105. See Geist, supra note 39, at 680 (noting that under the ITO each State had the right
to institute investment restrictions and to refuse the admission of FDI).
106. See McCulloch, supra note 56, at 544 (recognizing that United States based MNEs,
which were concerned that the ITO provisions favored host countries, influenced the United
States decision to not ratify the agreement); see also JOAN EDEI.MAN SPE rO, THE PoLrncs
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 69 (4th ed. 1990) (suggesting that business
groups feared that the 1TO allowed government over-management in trade and investment
matters).
107. See SPERO, supra note 106, at 69.
108. See JACKSON, supra note 99, at 15 (noting that the GATT filled the void in the in-
temationa economic system after the failure of the ITO and that it has become a de facto
organization).
109. See id. at 10 (stating that GATT constituted only a framework for reciprocal tariff
reductions and did not cover investment, per se).
110. But see Resolution on Investment, supra note 37, at 49-50 (recognizing, in 1955,
that increased investment flows to developing countries assist development efforts and
calling on both home and host countries to create FDI-friendly conditions).
111. See Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT B.I.S.D.
(30th Supp.) at 140 (1984) [hereinafter FIRA Dispute]; see also Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan
Christy, III, Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS): Limitations and
Prospects for the Future, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MuLTU.ATERAL TRADE
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTuRY AND U.S. IMPLEBMENTG LEGISLATION 439, 445
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996) (analyzing the purchase undertaking requirement in the
FIRA case).
112. See FIRA Dispute, supra note 111, at 142 (noting that Section 2 of the FIRA re-
quired that the Canadian government review foreign direct investment proposals under a set
of factors and permit entry only if the reviewing body determined that the investment pro-
posal was of "significant benefit to Canada").
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tions."3 FIRA essentially imposed a local content requirement"4 on foreign in-
vestors requiring them to purchase Canadian goods instead of importing goods of
their choice."' Although the panel found that the requirement of FIRA violated
Article III, paragraph 4 national treatment obligations,"6 it based its decision on
the discriminatory effects on those countries that would lose the opportunity to ex-
port goods to the investor."7 The panel did not consider the discriminatory treat-
ment to the foreign investor, per se, as important to the decision. " Thus, the
FIRA panel carefully avoided applying the GATT national treatment obligation to
FDI. It was not until the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations that FDI
was squarely on the GATT agenda and GATf agreements applied GATT princi-
ples to FDI.
B. URUGUAY RouND AND FDI-GATS, TRIMS, AND TRIPS
A significant part of the negotiations in the Uruguay Round dealt with so-called
"new issues," including services, trade-related investment measures, and intellec-
tual property protection. Negotiations on each of these issues resulted in agree-
ments that cover aspects of FDI.
1. GATS
Many consider the General Agreement on Trade in Services (" GATS")l 9 the
113. See id. at 146-48 (stating that the United States argued that the FIRA requirements
that foreign investors purchase Canadian goods instead of importing goods of their choice
violated GATT's Article III, paragraph 4 national treatment obligation).
114. See id. at 143 (describing that under FIRA foreign investors may submit purchase
undertakings which then obligates them to purchase from Canadian sources). Although
FIRA did not expressly require these undertakings, the purchase undertakings became nec-
essary commitments because of competition for investment approvals, and, therefore, the
Act essentially "required" them. See id.; see GRAHAM, supra note 101, at 71 (noting that
the effect of FIRA amounted to what is known as a local content requirement); Morrissey &
Rai, supra note 28, at 708 (defining a "local content requirement" as requiring that a cer-
tain percentage value of inputs be locally sourced).
115. See FIRA Dispute, supra note 111, at 143.
116. See id. at 159, 165.
117. Seeid. atl61.
118. See id. at 167 (stating that the "[p]anel does not consider it relevant nor does it feel
competent to judge how the foreign investors are affected by the purchase requirements"
because the national treatment obligation only applies to imported products, not foreign in-
vestors).
119. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS Agreement]; see Thomas
L. Brewer & Stephen Young, The Multilateral Agenda for Foreign Direct Investment.
Problems, Principles, and Priorities for Negotiations at the OECD and WTO, WORLD
CoMPwErON, June 1995, at 67, 72 (noting that the GATS Agreement is significant because
it is the first to cover services, the fastest growing sector in terms of FDI). See generally
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true investment agreement of the Uruguay Round."' GATS covers FDI in services
by defining trade in services as encompassing the supply of a service through the
establishment of a "commercial presence" in the territory of another GATS sig-
natory.' Negotiators chose the term "commercial presence" over "commercial
establishment" because developing countries sought to avoid the possible inter-
pretation of the commercial presence mode of delivery as constituting an absolute
right of establishment."
The liberalizing principles of most-favored nation treatment ("MFN"),"u trans-
parency," and national treatment"2 constitute the foundation for the GATS
Richard B. Self, General Agreement on Trade in Services, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANZATION: THE MULTLATERAL TRADE FRAmEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTuRY AND U.S.
ImPLEiENTING LEGISLATION, supra note I 11, at 523 (offering a synopsis of the GATS pro-
visions and signatory commitments).
120. See Investment and the Final Act of the Uruguay Round: A Preliminary Stocktak-
ing, OECD Trade Directorate at 5, OECD Doc. COMrDIDAFFEIME(94)56JREV I
(1994) [hereinafter OECD Uruguay Round Stocktaking] (arguing that the GATS "contains
the single largest number of investment-related provisions" of the Uruguay Round agree-
ments); see also Price & Christy, supra note 111, at 454 (considering the GATS the WVTO's
"real investment agreement").
121. See GATS Agreement, supra note 119, art. I, para. 2(c); see also id art. XXVIII,
para. 2(d) (defining "commercial presence" as "any type of business or professional estab-
lishment, including through (i) the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical
person, or (ii) the creation or maintenance of a branch or a representative office, within the
territory of a member for the purpose of supplying a service").
122. See Ansgar M. Wimmer, The Impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices on the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, WORLD COmPErrMOr , June 1996,
at 109, 113-14 (noting the semantic preference for "presence" in the OATS negotiations,
yet arguing that the provision can still be equated with FDI); see also OECD Uruguay
Round Stocktaking, supra note 120, at 5 (suggesting that the scope of the commercial pres-
ence provision is significantly more narrow than an asset-based definition of investment);
cf infra note 219 (noting that the OECD's Multilateral Agreement on Investment will use
the more encompassing asset-based definition of investment). The GATS's coverage of FDI
in services and the most-favored-nation requirement of GATT may pose a problem in rela-
tion to the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in that GATS signatories,
who are also MAI signatories, may be required to extend any MAI liberalization of FDI in
services to all GATS signatories, even those that are not signatories to the OECD MAI. See
Wimmer, supra, at 110-11.
123. See GATS Agreement, supra note 119, pt. II, art. II, para. I (defining "MFN treat-
ment" as "treatment no less favorable than [the member State] accords to like services and
service suppliers of any other country").
124. See id art. III (establishing the obligations of transparency as the prompt publica-
tion and notification of laws or measures affecting trade in services).
125. See id pt. m, art. XVII, para. 1 (defining "national treatment" as the member State
"accord[ing] to services and service suppliers of any other member, in respect of all meas-
ures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers"). The national treatment obligation, however, is
applicable only to the sectors included in the particular member State's schedule of com-
mitments. See id,
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Agreement. The Agreement imposes general obligations of MFN'2 6 and transpar-
ency on all members in all service sectors.'27 National treatment obligations, how-
ever, are specifically limited by the Agreement to the sectors and modes of supply
inscribed in the national schedules of commitments. 2
The Agreement also limits certain other disciplines relevant to FDI to the vari-
ous national commitments. These include restrictions on payments and transfers"'
and various restrictions on market access, including limitations on the total value
of inward direct investment'3" and the type of entity undertaking the direct invest-
ment.' The national schedules of commitments qualify each of these prohibitions.
In addition, investment screening and performance requirements are subject only
to the member's MFN obligation,'32 which means that a member State may subject
FDI in services to certain rigorous evaluation factors and conditions as long as the
member subjects all inward FDI to these requirements.'33
Developing country liberalization of FDI in services in GATS is predictably
limited through the national schedules of commitments. Article IV of GATS, how-
ever, encourages greater developing country liberalization by seeking to strengthen
the domestic service capacity in these countries.'34 Article IV appeals to members
to facilitate developing country access to technology 3 ' and information and distri-
bution networks'36 and to liberalize market access in sectors with developing
country export potential. 3 7 Article XIX, however, qualifies the liberalization ex-
pectations for developing countries by stating that subsequent liberalization shall
126. But see id. pt. II, art. II, para. 2 (allowing a member to qualify MFN obligations by
listing exemptions to MFN treatment in the Annex on Article II (MFN) Exemptions).
127. See id. arts. II-III (listing the MFN and transparency articles under the Part 11
heading "General Obligations and Disciplines").
128. See GATS Agreement, supra note 119, pt. III, art. XVII, para. 1.
129. See id. pt. II, art. XI, para. I (limiting the applicability of the prohibition on pay-
ment and transfer restrictions to those sectors inscribed in a member's specific schedule of
commitments).
130. See id. pt. III, art. XVI, para. 2(f).
131. See id. para. 2(e).
132. See id. arts. XVI, paras. 2(b) & 2(e) (subjecting certain restrictions related to in-
vestment screening and performance requirements to MFN obligations, yet limiting the
prohibition to measures affecting a sector inscribed in the member's schedule of commit-
ments); see also OECD Uruguay Round Stocktaking, supra note 120, at 12 n. 10 (noting that
investment screening and performance requirements are subject to article II MFN obliga-
tions).
133. Cf GATS Agreement, supra note 119, pt. II, art. II, para. 1 (defining "M17N treat-
ment" as "treatment no less favorable than [the member State] accords to like services and
service suppliers of any other country").
134. See id. pt. I, art. IV; see also Self, supra note 119, at 529 (providing a synopsis of
GATS article IV).
135. See id. para 1(a).
136. See id. para. l(b).
137. See id. para. I(c).
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give due respect to national policy objectives and development levels."' Further,
it accepts the likelihood that developing country members will undertake liberali-
zation commitments only commensurate with their level of development.'
With the national schedules of commitments qualifying most of the obligations
of the Agreement, FDI liberalization through the GATS Agreement, in effect, is
limited to the extent that members choose to enter upon specific liberalization
commitments."4 The overall effect of GATS on the liberalization of FDI in serv-
ices is, therefore, very limited. Article XIX, accordingly, seeks greater liberaliza-
tion by requiring a review of the agreement by the year 2000'. with the intention
of broadening its scope.'42
2. TRIMs Agreement 4 '
Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRIMs")' " were another of the so-
called new issues in the Uruguay Round. Before the Uruguay Round, GATIT's ju-
risdiction did not include investment measures because they were not considered
tariffs or subsidies and were, therefore, outside of GATT's scope.'"5 During the
Uruguay Round negotiations, however, negotiators viewed investment measures
138. See GATS Agreement, supra note 119, pt. III, art. XIX, para. 2 (providing for
"flexibility" in subsequent developing country liberalization and accepting liberalization in
fewer sectors and fewer transactions).
139. See id
140. See Wimmer, supra note 122, at 115 (noting the careful framework of obligations
and limitations of the GATS); see also OECD Uruguay Round Stocktaldng, supra note 120,
at 8 (highlighting that the provisions of GATS do not cover expropriation and related com-
pensation).
141. See GATS Agreement, supra note 119, pt. I, art XIX (providing for review of
GATS within five years from the date of its entry into force, 1995); cf infra notes 194-196
and accompanying text (noting that the TRIMs Agreement also provides for its review
within five years and how together with the GATS five-year review provision this repre-
sents built-in authority for negotiating the possible expansion of WTO coverage of FDI).
142. But see supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text (discussing the flexibility al-
lowed for subsequent developing country liberalization in services and requiring attention
to developing country national policy objectives).
143. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSMUt!ENTs-
REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement]. See generally,
Price & Christy, supra note 111, at 439 (reviewing the benefits and limitations of the
TRIMs Agreement).
144. See supra Part LC (discussing host country investment measures, both trade and
non-trade related).
145. See Mohamed Ariff, TRIMs: A North-South Divide or a Non-Issue?, 12 WORLD
ECON. 347, 348 (1989) (noting that GATT was perceived as an organization solely for the
regulation of trade); see also Christy, supra note 50, at 785 (citing India's submission to the
TRIMs negotiations, which suggested that investment measures were outside of GATT's
competence).
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that affected trade simply as another form of non-tariff trade barrier. 46 A 'RIM is
essentially any host country investment restriction that directly affects trade flows;
a TRIM either restricts imports or exports or requires imports or exports. 147 The
TRIMs negotiations sought to apply existing GATI Articles 48 to proscribe these
trade-distorting investment measures. 49 Yielding to pressure from developing
countries, negotiators sharply circumscribed the scope of the TRIMs negotiations
to include only those investment measures having direct trade distorting effects." 0
This "direct trade effects" focus excluded many investment measures from scru-
tiny and removed attention from the policies behind the measures.
15'
Developed countries argued that TRIMs represented nothing but host govern-
ment interference with a liberal trade regime."' Accordingly, the United States
presented a comprehensive list of TRIMs that it considered trade-distorting,' in-
cluding local content requirements, export performance requirements, trade bal-
ancing requirements, product mandating requirements, domestic sales restrictions,
foreign exchange and remittance restrictions, local equity requirements, technol-
ogy transfer and licensing requirements, and investment incentives. 4 The Euro-
pean Union supported the United States in all but technology transfer requirements
and local equity restrictions.' Japan supported all but local equity restrictions. 6
146. See Christy, supra note 50, at 779 (theorizing that the "TRIMs concept is a creation
of those wishing to rationalize the discussion of investment without broadening the context
of an agreement on tariffs and trade"); see also Kwaw, supra note 58, at 312 (asserting that
developed countries considered TRIMs to have the same trade-distorting effect as non-tariff
trade barriers).
147. See Christy, supra note 50, at 779 (employing this useful description).
148. See, e.g., Greenaway, supra note 60, at 379 (identifying GATT articles that are ap-
plicable to certain TRIMs); Maskus & Eby, supra note 62, at 531-33 (identifying applicable
GATT articles); Morrissey & Rai, supra note 28, at 711-16 (noting GATT articles that ap-
ply to various TRIMs).
149. See Ministerial Declaration of 20 Sept. 1986, GATT B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.) at 19; 25
I.L.M. 1626 (1987). The Punta del Este Declaration stated on TRIMs: "Following an ex-
amination of the operation of GATT Articles related to the trade restrictive and distorting
effects of investment measures, negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further provi-
sions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on trade." Id.
150. See Ariff, supra note 145, at 349 (noting that the TRIMs negotiations represented a
compromise between the developed and developing countries because not all investment
measures were analyzed-only those with direct trade effects).
151. See McCulloch, supra note 56, at 543.
152. Cf Low & Subramanian, supra note 62, at 416 (stating that developed countries
argued that TRIMs greatly affected an MNE's normal trade decisions but also noting that
firms are affected much less than the developed countries suggest).
153. Cf Kwaw, supra note 58, at 323 (citing a discussion on trade-related investment
measures in Delphi, Greece in 1989). "[it is hard to imagine any measure applied to in-
vestment which is not in some way and to some extent related to trade." Id.
154. See Maskus & Eby, supra note 62, at 527 (listing and defining each of the TRIMs
put forward by the United States).
155. See GRAHAM, supra note 101, at 72.
156. See id.
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Developing countries, on the other hand, argued that TRIMs are necessary
measures to counter abusive MNE practices, and if an agreement were to prohibit
TRlIs without addressing the trade-distorting practices of MNEs, it would result
in an inequitable, one-sided agreement." They argued, therefore, that GATT
should consider an agreement subjecting trade-distorting restrictive business prac-
tices to GATT principles to accompany any agreement that subjected TRIMs to
GATT principles.' Developing countries also emphasized the importance of in-
vestment measures in channeling FDI to national development objectives."" Fur-
thermore, developing countries asserted that the negotiations should only examine
those measures with direct and significantly adverse trade effects," thus leaving
many investment measures untouched. An examination of the TRIMs Agreement
reveals that the developing countries were successful in substantially limiting the
scope of the prohibitions of investment measures.
Article 1 of the TRIMs Agreement states that the agreement only applies to in-
vestment measures affecting trade in goods.' The GATS Agreement covers in-
vestment measures affecting trade in services." The GAIT principles of national
treatment,'63 prohibition on quantitative restrictions," and transparency" estab-
157. See Christy, supra note 50, at 785 (citing India's submission to the TRINs nego-
tiations).
158. See Kwaw, supra note 58, at 329; Low & Subramanian, supra note 62, at 416
(stating that developing countries viewed constraints on TRIMs as leaving no policy op-
tions for dealing with abusive MNE practices); see also supra notes 49-53 and accompa-
nying text (describing restrictive business practices from a developing country perspective).
159. See Kwaw, supra note 58, at 329 (revealing that developing countries argue that
such channeling measures are necessary because of the practices of NDIEs); see also Low &
Subramanian, supra note 62, at 418 (justifying TRIMs as developing country tools for pro-
moting industrialization, export enhancement, technology transfer, and general develop-
ment); Kwaw, supra note 58, at 312 (considering TRIMs an element of national investment
policy rather than trade policy and noting that investment control is within the sovereign
right of states).
160. See Kwaw, supra note 58, at 328 (postulating that such a focus would include local
content requirements, export requirements, and trade balancing requirements but would not
include local equity requirements, foreign exchange or remittance limitations, technology
transfer and licensing requirements, and incentives because the latter group does not have
significantly adverse trade effects).
161. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, art. I; Morrissey & Rai, supra note 28, at
714 (suggesting that Article 1 of TRIMs excludes technology transfer and licensing re-
quirements and incentives because they are not "related to trade in goods only").
162. See supra Part II.B.I (discussing the GATS Agreement).
163. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, art. 2 (referencing the GAIT Article III,
para. 4 national treatment provision); cf GATS Agreement, supra note 119, pt. III, art.
XVII, para. 1 (defining national treatment in the GATS Agreement context).
164. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, art. 2 (referencing the GAIT Article Xl,
para. 1 provision on the prohibition of quantitative restrictions).
165. See id art. 6, para. 1 (referencing the GAIT Article X provision on transparency
and notification); cf. GATS Agreement, supra note 119, pt. II, art. III (defining transparency
in the GATS Agreement context).
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lish the foundation for the TRIMs Agreement. The agreement states that members
shall not apply TRIMs inconsistently with existing GATT articles III (national
treatment) and XI (prohibitions on quantitative restrictions),'" and the annex to the
agreement lists investment measures that violate these GATT principles. 67 In-
vestment measures violative of a member's national treatment obligation include
local content requirements 68 and trade balancing requirements. 69 Investment
measures violative of GATT's prohibition on quantitative restrictions include gen-
eral import restrictions' and trade balancing restrictions,' foreign exchange bal-
ancing restrictions on imports,7 2 and domestic sales requirements (export restric-
tions). 7 The transparency obligation of the TRIMs Agreement requires members
to notify the WTO Secretariat of existing TRIMs7 and to provide additional in-
formation to a member upon request. 75
166. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, art. 2, para. 1; Price & Christy, supra note
11, at 451 (arguing that the TRIMs Agreement is simply an interpretation of GATT Arti-
cles III and XI in relation to investment measures); see also Low & Subramanian, supra
note 62, at 417 (providing an excellent list of investment measures, both those prohibited
by the TRIMs Agreement and those not covered).
167. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, annex (titling the annex section "Illustra-
tive List").
168. See id. annex, para. 1(a) (prohibiting requirements on "the purchase or use by an
enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in
terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a pro-
portion of volume or value of its local production"); see also Morrissey & Rai, supra note
28, at 708 (defining "local content restrictions" as measures requiring that a certain per-
centage value of inputs be locally sourced); cf supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the FIRA Dis-
pute and the local content requirement of the Canadian investment act).
169. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, annex, para. 1(b) (prohibiting requirements
"that an enterprise's purchase or use of imported products be limited to an amount related
to the volume or value of local products that it exports"); see also Kwaw, supra note 58, at
319 (defining "trade balancing requirements" as requirements obliging an investor to offset
imports of materials with an equal value of product exports).
170. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, annex, para. 2(a) (prohibiting restrictions
on "the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production,
generally").
171. See id. para. 2(a) (prohibiting, based on the quantitative restrictions prohibition,
restrictions on "the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local
production... to an amount related to the volume or value of local production that it ex-
ports").
172. See id. para. 2(b) (prohibiting restrictions on "the importation by an enterprise of'
products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to foreign ex-
change to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise,"
i.e. export levels).
173. See id. para. 2(c) (prohibiting restrictions on "the exportation or sale for export by
an enterprise of products, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of vol-
ume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local pro-
duction").
174. See id. art. 6, para. 2.
175. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, art. 6, para. 3 (requiring disclosure of in-
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Developing countries receive slightly more favorable treatment than developed
countries under the TRIMs Agreement. Article 4 allows developing countries to
temporarily resuscitate an investment measure that is prohibited by the Agreement
in order to combat a balance of payments crisis. 76 In addition, Article 5 grants de-
veloping countries a five-year waiver from application of the Agreement.'" How-
ever, unlike the GATS Agreement, which allows selective liberalization through a
country's schedule of commitments, the TRIMs prohibitions apply to all members
after the phase-in periods have expired.'78
As with the GATS Agreement,'" the TRIMs Agreement is only a modest first
step toward the regulation and liberalization of direct investment.'"' The Agree-
ment essentially codifies the GATT panel's conclusions in the FIRA Dispute.'
The prohibition of only a limited number of investment measures attests to the
pressure of developing countries in the negotiations." The Agreement's limited
focus on "trade-distorting" investment measures leaves many other investment
measures outside of its scope and, therefore, unaccountable to the multilateral
trading system. 183 Investment measures not covered by the TRIMs Agreement in-
clude: local equity requirements, technology transfer and licensing requirements,
formation to a member upon request except when disclosure would "impede law enforce-
ment or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate com-
mercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private").
176. See id art. 4 (referring to GATT 1994 Article XVIll and other balance of payments
provisions and stipulating that the institution of a prohibited investment measure must com-
ply with the balance of payments provisions requirements).
177. See id art. 5, para. 2 (providing that developing countries shall eliminate prohibited
TRIMs within five years of the date of entry into force of the TRIMs Agreement); see also
id para. 3 (allowing a further extension beyond the five year period for a developing coun-
try having "particular difficulties" implementing the provisions).
178. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, art. 5, para. 2 (granting least developed
countries a seven year phase-in period). Because the TRIMs Agreement entered into force
in 1995, developing countries must be in compliance by the year 2000 and least-developed
countries by the year 2002. See ia
179. See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text (suggesting that the GATS
Agreement is limited in its liberalization of FDI in services).
180. See Price & Christy, supra note 111, at 439 (claiming that the TRIMS Agreement
"represents a first significant, and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to negotiate an agree-
ment on investment within the context of the multilateral trading system").
181. See GRAHAM, supra note 101, at 72; OECD Uruguay Round Stocktaking, supra
note 118, at 5; see also supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the FIRA Dispute and the panel's
findings).
182. See GRAHAM, supra note 101, at 72 (positing that the limited prohibition is the re-
sult of "bowing" to developing country pressure); see also supra notes 157-160 and ac-
companying text (describing developing country positions in the negotiations).
183. See OECD Uruguay Round Stocktaking, supra note 120, at 5 (noting that the an-
nex's "Illustrative List" only prohibits a limited number of TRIMs).
184. See Greenaway, supra note 60, at 379 (noting investment measures that do not have
clear trade-distorting effects); see also Price & Christy, supra note I ll, at 453-54 (pointing
out that the TRIMs Agreement does not address several establishment and operational con-
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local manufacturing requirements, personnel entry restrictions, local employment
requirements, remittance restrictions, and export performance requirements,
among others. The absence of a prohibition on export performance require-
ments, ' 5 in particular, is a substantial failure of the agreement'8 6 because export
subsidies, which are closely related, are prohibited under the international trading
system.'87
The TRIMs Agreement is not a complete investment agreement. The TRIMs
Agreement contains no rules on screening and establishment issues.188 There are
no provisions for the repatriation of capital or the free movement of personnel.'89
TRIMs also does not cover expropriation and adequate compensation issues.'"
Nevertheless, developing countries are constrained in dealing with MNEs by
the TRIMs Agreement's prohibition of several common investment measures. 
9'
Developing countries argue that the TRIMs Agreement is deficient because it fo-
cuses only on the outcomes of investment measures and ignores the underlying
causes for the imposition of such measures in the first place-the benefit-distorting
practices of MNEs.' 9
The greatest achievement of the TRIMs Agreement is that it clearly placed di-
rect investment issues onto the WTO agenda. 93 Article 9 requires that the Council
for Trade in Goods review the TRIMs Agreement by the year 2000 with a view to
determining, at that time, whether the WTO should negotiate provisions on in-
vestment and competition policy."9 The five-year review provisions of both
GATS 95 and TRIMs together provide built-in authority for negotiating the possi-
trols).
185. See Kwaw, supra note 58, at 319 (defining an "export performance requirement"
as a condition imposed on MNEs requiring that a certain amount of output be apportioned
for export, often more than what the MNE would export without the restriction).
186. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 62, at 421 (explaining that larger countries,
such as India, resisted the prohibition of export performance requirements because they
wanted the ability to secure the benefits of increased exports in return for allowing MNEs
into their large, protected markets).
187. See id. (calling this "an unjustifiable anomaly").
188. For a discussion of investment screening and host government criteria see supra
notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
189. Cf infra notes 247, 256 and accompanying text (discussing, respectively, the MAI
provisions for profit repatriation and movement of personnel).
190. Cf infra notes 241-246 and accompanying text (discussing the MAI provisions on
expropriation and investment protection).
191. See Morrissey & Rai, supra note 28, at 703.
192. Seeid. at7ll.
193. See OECD Uruguay Round Stocktaking, supra note 120, at 5 (asserting that the
"incorporation of specific investment-related disciplines in the multilateral trading system"
is the primary achievement of the TRIMs Agreement).
194. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, art. 9; see also Singapore Declaration, su-
pra note 2, para. 20 (establishing a working group to examine the relationship between
trade and investment and competition policy).
195. See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text (noting that the GATS Agreement
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ble expansion of the WTO's coverage of direct investment.'
3. TRIPS Agreement and the Dispute Settlement Understanding
Two other Uruguay Round agreements are important to the current VTO
framework regarding FDI. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights ("TRIPS")' provides basic protection for the transfer of
technology through FDI operations."'s This is an important protection for FDI be-
cause nearly all FDI undertakings involve technology transfer from the MNE to a
subsidiary in the host country.' Protection of this technology will provide addi-
tional incentive for such a transfer.' TRIPS grants developing countries a five-
year waiver in applying the provisions. 2
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("Dispute Settlement Understanding") ' is also relevant to
the current FDI framework because each of the above discussed agreements-
GATS, TRIMs, and TRIPS-is subject to the strengthened VITO dispute
settlement process.20 3 Disputes concerning FDI-related provisions in any of these
agreements can be swiftly arbitrated in the new system.'
provides for its review before the year 2000).
196. See Singapore Declaration, supra note 2, para. 20 (referring to the "built-in
agenda" under the TRIMs Agreement); see also DeAnne Julius, International Direct In-
vestment: Strengthening the Policy Regime, in MANAGING T-M WORLD EcONOmY: F IFY
YEARs AFTER BRETON VOODs 269, 281 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994) (describing the dual
five-year provisions as a "natural opening for broadening the VTO's coverage of invest-
ment issues").
197. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC, LEGAL
INSTRUmiS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [herein-
after TRIPS Agreement].
198. See id pt. I, art. 7 (establishing the facilitation and protection of technology trans-
fers as the primary objective of the agreement).
199. See Brewer & Young, supra note 119, at 75.
200. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 197, pt. I, art. 7 (aiming to facilitate technology
transfers).
201. See id pt. VI, art. 65, para. 2 (granting developing countries a five year delay in
applying the TRIPS provisions, except for the national treatment provision of Article 3 and
the MFN treatment provision of Article 4). For a general review of the TRIPS Agreement
and its implications for developing countries, see U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEv., THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRms, U.N. Sales No. E.96.1I.D.10 (1996) and
Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, 72
Cm-KENT L. REV. 385, 387-389 (1996) (examining developing country interests in the ne-
gotiations over intellectual property protection).
202. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL 1, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
203. See generally PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF GATT DisPUrE
SETrLEm1Er (4th ed. 1994) (periodically updated) (offering a comprehensive analysis of
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can be swiftly arbitrated in the new system.2°
III. THE OECD MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT
ON INVESTMENT (MAI)
A. ORIGINS OF THE MAI
Outside of the GATT/WTO framework, the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (" OECD" )20 has dealt extensively with investment is-
sues."° Recognizing the tremendous growth and increasing importance of FDI to
dispute settlement procedures and the evolution of the GATT dispute settlement system and
providing texts of GATT dispute settlement decisions).
204. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 202, art. 1 (stating that the un-
derstanding applies only to disputes between WTO members). See generally Thomas L.
Brewer, International Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Evolving Regime for
Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 633 (1995) (discussing WTO dis-
pute settlement as it applies to FDI disputes under the covered agreements). But cf infra
Part III.B.4 (discussing the certain inclusion of an investor-to-state dispute settlement
mechanism in the OECD's Multilateral Agreement on Investment). MNEs cannot bring a
dispute on their own behalf challenging host country treatment of their investment as viola-
tive of a WTO agreement. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 202, art. I.
MNEs must either challenge the host country's laws or policies in the courts of the host
country or seek to have their home government bring a case on their behalf in the WTO. Cf
Price & Christy, supra note 111, at 453 (noting that the home government may have differ-
ent priorities and interests, and, therefore, the ability of an MNE to challenge an action in
the WTO may be limited).
205. See OECD, OECD Member Countries (last modified May 5, 1997)
<http://www.oecd.org/about/member-countries.html>. The OECD is primarily a developed
country organization. Its membership includes the following 29 countries: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. See id.
206. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEv., NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR
FOREIGN-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES (1993) (providing that OECD members should grant
national treatment to enterprises of other members operating within their territory); ORG.
FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEv., CODE OF LIBERALIZATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
(1993) (calling on members to abolish restrictions on the establishment of direct invest-
ment, except under a limited number of exceptions); ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND
DEv., CODE OF LIBERALIZATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS (1993) (covering repa-
triation of profits from direct investment); ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEv., THE
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1994) (containing a voluntary code
of conduct for MNEs). For a review of these instruments and their relation to OECD foreign
direct investment regulation, see generally MARIE-FRANCE HOUDE, OECD INSTRUMENTS
FOR PROMOTING THE LIBERALIZATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (OECD Working
Paper Vol. III, No. 24, 1995) and William H. Witherell, Towards an International Set of
Rules for Investment, in ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., TOWARDs
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the international economy, the OECD Ministers established a Negotiating Group
in the OECD 1995 Ministerial meeting to begin negotiating a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment ("MAF')3 °0 The OECD goal is to complete negotiations
by the 1998 ministerial meeting ° and for the Agreement to enter into force by
January 1, 1999.210 The OECD MAI seeks "high standards" ' 1' for the liberaliza-
tion of investment measures and post-establishment investment protection and an
effective dispute settlement mechanism providing for both state-to-state and in-
vestor-to-state disputes?" MAI will be a freestanding international treaty with an
existence separate from the other OECD instruments?" It will be open for acces-
sion to all interested countries, both OECD members and non-OECD members.2
MULTLATERAL INvESmNT RULES 17 (1996).
207. See Communiqud of the Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, at 3,
OECD Do. SG/PRESS(95)41 (1995) [hereinafter OECD 1995 Communique]; OECD Be-
gins Negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, OECD Doe.
SG/PRESS(95)65 (1995) (stating that actual discussions among members began in Septem-
ber 1995); see also Alan Larson, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Origins and
State of Play, in MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVEMThrt .STATE OF PLAY AS OF JULY
1996 4, 4-5 (OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(96)157, 1996) (noting that OECD working groups
have been studying the feasibility of an MAI since 1991).
208. See David Robertson, The OECD Investment Mandate of 1995: Catching Up With
the Market, in TOWARDS MULTtlATERAL INvEsMmNr RULES, supra note 206, at 75 (recog-
nizing that the WTO is the preferable forum for an investment agreement because of its
broad membership, but asserting that the OECD has greater experience with investment is-
sues); see also Observer: Painful Shuffle, FIN. TIMEs, May 3, 1995, at 21 (noting that the
Agreement was originally to be known as the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA) but
was changed to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) because the United States
delegation wanted to avoid the acronym MIA, which is commonly known to signify
"Missing in Action").
209. See M4I May 1997 Report, supra note 15, annex (resolving to complete the MAI
before the 1998 OECD Ministerial Meeting). The OECD holds its Ministerial meetings in
either May or June of each year.
210. Cf Alastair Newton, Accession by Non-OECD members, Institutional Arrange-
ments and Implementation of the Agreement, in MULTILATERAL AGREEEr ON
Ttusmr: STATE OF PLAY AS OF JULY 1996, supra note 207, at 28, 31 (suggesting that
the MA will undergo a ratification process similar to the Uruguay Round Agreements and
suggesting that January would allow sufficient time for a critical mass of governments to
have completed their domestic ratification requirements for the MAI to enter into force).
211. See OECD 1995 Communiqud, supra note 207, at 5; Robert Ley, The Multilateral
Agreement on Investment: Some Questions and Answers, OECD OBSERVER, Dec. 1996, at
28, 29 (special edition for the WTO Ministerial Conference) (explaining that "'high stan-
dards' refers primarily to the quality of the investment environment" in terms of market
access and legal security).
212. See Ley, supra note 211, at 29.
213. See, e.g., supra note 206 (listing OECD instruments that deal with investment is-
sues).
214. See Non-Member Countries and Institutional Issues, in TOWARDS MULTILATERAL
INVEST mT RULES, supra note 206, at 157-58.
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B. THE PARTICULARS OF THE MAI
Although the MAI negotiation is still ongoing,"' the basic framework of the
MAI is discernable.
1. Definition of Investment
The MAI will define "investment" broadly to enable a comprehensive applica-
tion of the agreement.2" 6 The definition will fall somewhere between the classical
definition of FD1217 and the definition of portfolio investment."' The objective is
to cover all forms of tangible and intangible investment that create an actual stake
in the host economy.219
2. The Main Principles: National Treatment, Most-Favored Nation
Treatment, and Transparency
The MAI liberalization provisions for host country investment measures and
215. The agreement was originally supposed to be concluded in May 1997. Several is-
sues, however, particularly related to exceptions, could not be finalized. For draft texts of
the agreement, see May 1997 MAI Draft, supra, note 17 and January 1997 MAI Draft, su-
pra note 17. See generally Frans Engering, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment,
TRANSNAT'L CORP., Dec. 1996, at 147 (offering an overview of the MAI by the Chairperson
of the Negotiating Group).
216. See May 1997 MAI Draft, supra, note 17, art. II, § 2 (defining "investment" for
purposes of the agreement). Although the MAI will define investment broadly, the May
draft indicates that an interpretative note will be inserted into the agreement to indicate that
"in order to qualify as an investment under the MAI, an asset must have the characteristics
of an investment, such as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of
gain or profit, or the assumption of risk." Id. n.2; cf Edward M. Graham, Investment and
the New Multilateral Trade Context, in MARKET AccEss AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND:
INVESTMENT, COMPETrTON AND TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTVES 35, 55 (OECD ed. 1996) (re-
alizing that the "broader the definition of investment, the greater the degree of protection
and liberalization afforded by the Agreement").
217. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (offering several common definitions of
FDI and relating them to portfolio investment).
218. See Thierry Francq, Definition and Treatment of Investment and Investors, in
MULTLATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: STATE OF PLAY AS OF JULY 1996, supra note
207, at 13.
219. See id. (noting that the MAI definition will use an "asset-based" definition of in-
vestment instead of a more restrictive "enterprise-based" definition); id. at 13-14 (identi-
fying types of investment likely to be included and excluded from the definition); see also
Graham, supra note 20, at 209 (suggesting that a broad definition of"investment" is desir-
able in order to cover the many ways an MNE can undertake investment in a host country,
including, inter alia, through a joint venture, a subsidiary, or a turnkey operation); cf
OECD Uruguay Round Stocktaking, supra note 120, at 5 (suggesting that the scope of the
commercial presence provision of GATS is a significantly more narrow definition than an
asset-based definition of investment).
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performance requirements ' will be based on the principles of national treat-
ment,"1 most-favored nation treatment (MFN),m and transparencyt  and will ap-
ply to both the pre- and post-establishment stages of investment"2 4 Mechanisms
for a standstill and rollback of investment measures are already in place.t The
MAI would go much further than the TRIMs Agreement in prohibiting investment
measures and performance requirements' because the MAI seeks to eliminate all
"investment-distorting!" measures rather than the more limited set of "trade-
distorting" measures addressed in the TRIMs Agreement.m At a minimum the
MAI will prohibit all of the measures suggested by the United States in the TRIMs
negotiations, 9 except perhaps for investment incentives."" Furthermore, while the
TRIMs and GATS Agreements employ a bottom-up approach the MAI will
220. See supra Part LC (identifying and discussing various host country investment
measures and performance requirements).
221. See Larson, supra note 207, at 6 (defining national treatment as "non-
discrimination as between domestic and foreign investors").
222. Seeid (defining MEN treatment as non-discrimination "among foreign investors
from different nations").
223. See Francq, supra note 218, at 15 (defining transparency as "ensur[ing] adequate
information for foreign investors on the legal framework of each state"). The Agreement
will require disclosure of all investment laws and policies, including those not formally re-
corded. See id
224. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Progress Report by the 41 Negotiat-
ing Group, OECD Doc. OCDEIGD(96)78 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 MAl Progress Report].
Thus, the MAI seeks to eliminate both entry and operational controls. See supra Part I.C
(discussing the use of entry and operational controls by host countries).
225. See Francq, supra note 218, at 15 (claiming that the MAI will prohibit the intro-
duction of additional non-conforming measures (standstill) and allow only future liberali-
zation of measures (rollback)).
226. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the modest liberalization of the TRIMs Agreement
in this area).
227. See Anders Almlid, Special Topics, in MULTILATERAL AGRxeMENT ON
INv EsTMENT: STATE OF PLAY AS OF JULY 1996, supra note 207, at 17-18 (stating that nego-
tiators believe that national treatment and IFN obligations may not, in and of themselves,
be adequate to remove all efficiency-robbing performance requirements); see also Larson,
supra note 207, at 6 (stating that negotiators seek to discipline even those performance re-
quirements that are applied without discrimination).
228. See Ley, supra note 211, at 29.
229. See GRAHAiM, supra note 101, at 114 (noting that the IM negotiators are discuss-
ing all of the measures, except incentives, contained in the United States submission to the
TRIMs negotiations plus manufacturing limitations); see also supra note 154 and accompa-
nying text (identifying the investment measure list of the United States in the TRIMs nego-
tiations).
230. See Ahnlid, supra note 227, at 19 (stating that "it may--regrettably for some--be
difficult to develop far-reaching new disciplines on investment incentives within the time
frame of the MAI negotiations."); see also Larson, supra note 207, at 7 (claiming that many
countries consider investment incentives "legitimate tools" to attract investment).
231. See Francq, supra note 218, at 15 (describing that a bottom-up approach, also
known as a positive list approach, liberalizes only those sectors or measures specifically
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utilize the more encompassing top-down approach to liberalization of investment
measures. 2 Parties to the MAI will be required to liberalize all measures or sec-
tors unless a measure or sector is specifically excluded from the liberalization ob-
ligations. 3
Although the objective of any agreement is to keep exceptions and deroga-
tions"4 to the general obligations at a minimum, the MAI negotiators are discuss-
ing certain standard exceptions to the general obligations of national treatment and
MFN treatment. Negotiators are discussing the inclusion of exceptions for reasons
of national security, 5 public order, and international peace and security. 6 An ex-
ception for the protection of "linguistic and cultural diversity" is also being con-
sidered? 7 The Agreement will also allow specific national reservations, listing
measures that a State will maintain, although not conforming to the general obli-
gations." 8 In addition, the Negotiating Group is considering whether to allow a
temporary derogation from the general obligations for serious balance of payments
difficulties. " 9 On the whole, the MAI promises to significantly advance the liber-
alization of investment measures and performance requirements far beyond the
limited level of liberalization achieved in the Uruguay Round agreements.24
3. Investor/Investment Protection
The MAI provisions on investor and investment protection were among the first
agreed to in the negotiating sessions.24" ' The MAI will borrow from the standard of
listed).
232. See id. at 15-16 (characterizing the MAI's top-down approach, also known as a
negative list approach, as liberalizing all measures or sectors unless specifically excluded by
the agreement); see also Low & Subramanian, supra note 62, at 423 (asserting that a top-
down approach (negative list approach) can have the effect of a bottom-up approach (posi-
tive list) if too many exceptions are allowed).
233. Francq, supra note 218, at 15-16.
234. In common international legal usage an "exception" allows a postponement of ob-
ligations for an unlimited amount of time, while a "derogation" allows only a temporary
postponement of obligations. GRAHAM, supra note 101, at 48 n.1.
235. See Graham, supra note 216, at 40-41 (arguing that determining the reasonable
scope of a national security exception is the primary issue).
236. See 1996 MAI Progress Report, supra note 224, at 4.
237. See Francq, supra note 218, at 16; Graham, supra note 216, at 41 (suggesting that a
cultural exception is most often discussed for the video and motion picture industries based
on the fear that foreign domination of these industries will affect the cultural "identity" of
host countries).
238. See Francq, supra note 218, at 16.
239. See id.
240. See supra Parts II.B.1-2 (discussing the liberalization of investment measures in the
GATS and TRIMs Agreements, respectively).
241. See 1996 MAI Progress Report, supra note 224, at 4 (noting that draft provisions
on standards of treatment, compensation for expropriation, protection from strife, subroga-
tion, and transfer of funds have been prepared).
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treatment for investments provided for in most bilateral investment treaties." The
MAI will require "fair and equitable treatment" at least as favorable as required by
international law along with "constant protection and security" for investments.!
Expropriation will be prohibited except if it is "in the public interest, on a non-
discriminatory basis, against payment of prompt, adequate and effective compen-
sation, and in accordance with due process of law."' " Negotiators are considering
whether to include language to cover exchange rate risk on the amount of compen-
sation.245 The MAI will also contain provisions for compensation under certain cir-
cumstances of loss due to strife.2" Finally, all payments to and profits from an
MNE investment will be freely transferable under the MAI at the market rate of
exchange. 7 A balance of payments derogation from this free transferability obli-
gation is being considered2
4. Dispute Settlement in the MAI
The MAI will provide for XVTO-style state-to-state dispute settlement,2 with
242. See Hansen & Aranda, supra note 45, at 884 (noting that most BITs require "fair
and equitable treatment, national and most-favoured-nation treatment" with international
law standards on expropriation and the transfer of finds).
243. See Joachim Karl, The Multilateral Agreement on Imestment and Investor Protec-
tion, in MuLTILATERAL AGREmENT ON INVESTENT. STATE OF PLAY AS OF JULY 1996, su-
pra note 207, at 9, 9 (describing the introductory article in the MA section on investment
protection).
244. See id at 10 (describing the expropriation provision and noting that the terms
"prompt, adequate and effective" and "due process of law" will be clarified in the Agree-
ment); see also Messing, supra note 72, at 130 n.15 (explaining that the standard "prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation" is known as the Hull Formula after United States
Secretary of State Cordell Hull who, in a 1938 dispute with Mexico over Mexico's nation-
alization of oil fields, asserted that Mexico must, under international law, pay "prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation" to the foreign owners of the nationalized oil fields).
245. See id (discussing the issues of devaluation of a host country's currency and pay-
ment of compensation in a hard currency).
246. See id at 10-11 (defining strife as when the investor incurs a loss as the result of
war, a state of emergency, or other similar events and noting that the host country will not
be required to pay compensation under such circumstances unless the host government ex-
propriates the investor's property or directly and unnecessarily causes the loss).
247. See id at 11 (noting that several parties would like a provision ensuring that capital
transfers can be made in a hard currency).
248. See Karl, supra note 243, at I I (stating that several negotiating parties believe that
there should not be an exception for balance of payments difficulties while others believe
that restrictions in line with the IMF Agreement should be permissible).
249. See Marino Baldi, 4 Conceptual Framework for an MA4 Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, in MULTLATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESThENT: STATE OF PLAY AS OF JULY
1996, supra note 207, at 21, 24-26 (describing a \VTO-like model for MA! state-to-state
arbitration); Graham, supra note 216, at 54-55 (positing that the MAI wvill likely follow the
"WVTO model" for state-to-state disputes and describing the stages in the WTO model);
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 202 (defining the WVTO's dispute settlement
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stages for consultation, conciliation, mediation, and, if necessary, binding arbitra-
tion by a panel of experts." ° There is also a consensus to include provisions for
investor-to-state dispute settlement in the MAI."' Binding investor-to-state arbi-
tration that would empower an arbitration panel to order a change in the host
country's laws, however, would raise loss of sovereignty concerns.3 2 Some have
suggested that a NAFTA-style investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism may
be appropriate to remedy sovereignty concerns. 3 Such a mechanism would allow
the investor to recover monetary damages from the host country government but
would not empower the arbitration panels to order changes in a host country's
laws. 4 The final elements of the MAI's investor-to-state dispute settlement
mechanism are still being negotiated, but it is certain that the MAI will provide
some sort of investor-to-state arbitration mechanism. The provision for investor-
to-state dispute settlement, by itself, will be significant because it offers more than
what is currently available under the WTO system.2"
5. Special Issues: MNE Practices & Developing Country Accession
MAI negotiators are also considering a number of sub-issues and whether and
how they should be provided for in the Agreement. Among the additional issues
being discussed are provisions for the free movement of personnel,256 privatization
and state enterprise issues, and MNE practices." 7 The issue of restrictive MNE
practices is particularly important, considering that the OECD hopes to secure the
accession of developing countries to the MA12 ". and the control of restrictive busi-
rules and procedures).
250. See Baldi, supra note 249, at 24-26.
251. See Larson, supra note 207, at 6; see also Graham, supra note 216, at 53 (arguing
that investors will deem the MAI ineffective if it does not include investor-to-state arbitra-
tion provisions).
252. See Graham, supra note 216, at 53-54.
253. See id.; Christopher N. Camponovo, Comment, Dispute Settlement and the OECD
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 181, 212
(1996) (recommending that the MAI follow the NAFTA model of investor-to-state dispute
settlement, which provides for an effective dispute settlement forum and protects State sov-
ereignty).
254. See Graham, supra note 216, at 53-54 (describing the NAFTA-style investor-to-
state dispute settlement mechanism).
255. See Larson, supra note 207, at 6; Julius, supra note 196, at 280-81 (stating that
MNEs cite the lack of an investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO as the
greatest drawback of the WTO system); see also supra notes 202-204 and accompanying
text (discussing the WTO dispute settlement process and noting that it only provides for
state-to-state disputes).
256. See Ahnlid, supra note 227, at 18 (stating that the MAI will contain provisions for
movement of personnel, but the extent of liberalization in this area has not yet been deter-
mined).
257. See id. at 17-20 (discussing the state of negotiations on these additional issues).
258. See infra notes 263-265 and accompanying text (describing the provisions and
goals of the MAI in terms of developing country accession to the Agreement).
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ness practices 9 is a primary concern for developing countries.2 l Although the
MAI Negotiating Group recognizes that MNE practices can negatively affect in-
vestment, 261 the majority of the negotiators believe that it is not appropriate for the
MAI to contain provisions on MNE practices.~2
Nevertheless, the MAI will be open to accession by non-OECD countries, in-
cluding developing countries.263 The OECD has undertaken a commitment to ac-
tively pursue those non-OECD countries interested in acceding to the Agree-
ment?' and has theorized that all countries, including developing countries,
desiring to attract further direct investment will benefit from accession to the
Agreement."5 After the Agreement enters into force, acceding countries will be
required to accept certain "core' conditions of the Agreementl - Negotiators,
259. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text (discussing restrictive business prac-
tices and the effect on developing countries).
260. See supra Part LC (discussing the investment measures and performance require-
ments that developing host countries institute, in part, to counteract the practices of MNEs).
261. See Ahmlid, supra note 227, at 20 ("It is not only government measures that may
distort investment flows between countries, but also actions taken by individual firms...
which can negatively impact on foreign investment.").
262- See id. (stating that the majority "feels it is neither appropriate nor possible for
MAI to interfere with the private practices and decisions of specific companies .... [,V]hat
private entities decide to do in their own right is not, and should not according to the ma-
jority, be covered by MAI.").
263. See OECD 1995 Communiqui, supra note 207, at 3. Non-OECD countries joining
before the ratification period will be allowed to negotiate their own specific reservations to
the general obligations. See Newton, supra note 210, at 30-31 n.12 (defining the ratification
period as the time between the 1997 OECD Ministerial meeting and January 1, 1998). Non-
OECD countries will have the same ability as OECD members to negotiate reservations b-
fore the presentment of the MAI to the 1998 OECD Ministerial meeting. See id Those
countries acceding after the presentation of the MAI at the 1998 OECD Ministerial meeting
will not be able to negotiate country-specific reservations. See id at 30 & n.l I (asserting
that the MAI will follow the Uruguay Round model).
264. See Communiqud of the Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, at 5,
OECD Doe. SG/COMINEWS(96)53 (May 1996) (calling for an "intensified dialogue with
non-member countries").
265. See Ley, supra note 211, at 29-30 (claiming that accession to the MAI will generate
additional inward direct investment for any acceding country because the high standards of
market access and investor protection contained in the Agreement appeal to investors); Lar-
son, supra note 207, at 5 (believing that the investment liberalization and protection stan-
dards in the MAI will increase the general economic welfare of all countries who are a party
to the Agreement); Messing, supra note 72, at 134 (asserting that it is in developing coun-
tries' "long-term self-interest... to prepare to work their way up the graduated liberaliza-
tion ladder to the high platform of investment policy that will attract the capital (especially
the lower-cost, long-term, conservative capital) that they need"); cf Graham, supra note
20, at 206 (suggesting that developing countries with greater ties to OECD countries statis-
tically have a higher productivity and growth rate than those developing countries without
such ties).
266. See Newton, supra note 210, at 32 (suggesting that the MAI will require adherence
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however, are considering whether to allow a transition period or temporary reser-
vations to the obligations for developing countries acceding at this stage."67
C. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MAI
The MAI will become the most comprehensive set of multilateral6 8 rules on
foreign direct investment in existence. Its provisions go much further than the cur-
rent multilateral agreements in this area, GATS and TRIMs,269 in liberalizing in-
vestment measures and in providing rules for the protection of investments. The
MAI's coverage of" investment-distorting" investment measures will result in the
liberalization of a much broader array of measures than the more limited coverage
of "trade-distorting" investment measures in the TRIMs Agreement.27 ' Further-
more, the Uruguay Round agreements do not deal with issues of expropriation and
the free transfer of capital.2 The MAI's coverage of these issues is, thus, unique
to the multilateral economic system. The MAI is a welcome addition to the field.
The Agreement, however, has several shortcomings that will limit its ultimate
value to the world economic system. The OECD is an organization comprised
primarily of developed countries273 and tends to view FDI issues from a developed
country perspective. 4 Only these developed country OECD members have been
able to participate in the negotiation of the Agreement.2" Although the MAI will
be a free-standing international treaty open to accession of all countries, it is
to a certain benchmark level of liberalization).
267. See Ley, supra note 211, at 30.
268. But see Graham, supra note 20, at 207 (asserting that the MAI is more correctly
termed a" plurilateral" agreement rather than a "multilateral" agreement).
269. See supra Parts II.B.1-2 (analyzing the modest liberalization of FDI in the GATS
and TRIMs Agreements).
270. See supra Part III.B.2-3 (analyzing the likely MAI provisions for investment meas-
ure liberalization and investment protection); see also supra notes 188-190 and accompa-
nying text (noting the absence of rules on establishment issues and investment protection in
the TRMs Agreement).
271. See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text (identifying the investment meas-
ures prohibited by the TRIMs Agreement).
272. See supra notes 189-190 and accompanying text (noting the absence of provisions
on expropriation and capital transfers in the TRIMs Agreement).
273. See OECD, OECD Member Countries (last modified May 5, 1997)
<http://www.oecd.org/aboutmember-countries.html>. The OECD membership includes the
following 29 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxem-
bourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See id.
274. See SomAnRMAH, supra note 20, at 69-72 (examining the institutions shaping in-
ternational law on FDI).
275. But cf supra notes 264-265 and accompanying text (noting that the OECD has un-
dertaken a vigorous effort to educate non-OECD members on the Agreement's provisions
and the benefits of acceding to it); see also supra notes 263-267 and accompanying text
(describing the accession process for non-OECD countries).
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doubtful that the Agreement will secure the accession of many non-OECD coun-
tries," 6 especially developing countries, 2" because of the developed-country ori-
entation of the Agreement. The decision of MAI negotiators to exclude provisions
regulating the restrictive business practices of MNEs" is an additional weakness
of the Agreement in its effort to attract developing countries.
The absence of developing country participation in the Agreement will greatly
diminish its value to the international economic system.2' The subjection of de-
veloping countries to the liberalization requirements of the MAI would yield much
greater benefits to the international economic system. The capital-exporting devel-
oped countries, more or less, already maintain relatively few barriers to foreign
direct investment.O0 It is the developing countries who maintain substantial barri-
ers to investment?" and whose participation would, therefore, generate greater
benefits through the corresponding liberalization of these barriers.
IV. THE SETTING FOR WTO NEGOTIATIONS, ISSUES, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE SETNMG FOR VTO NEGOTIATIONS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Negotiations for a comprehensive agreement on direct investment in the VTO
have not yet begun. The language of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, in-
serted at the insistence of the developing country coalitionm opposed to such an
276. See Graham, supra note 20, at 207 (suggesting that few non-OECD countries are
likely to join the Agreement).
277. See Wimmer, supra note 122, at 111-12 (fearing the absence of developing country
accession to the Agreement and favoring the WTO as the forum with greater possibility for
a more inclusive Agreement).
278. See supra notes 257-262 and accompanying text (discussing the decision to not in-
clude provisions on restrictive MNE practices in the MAI); see also supra notes 45-53 and
accompanying text (describing the various practices of MNEs and the costs to developing
economies resulting from these practices).
279. See Graham, supra note 20, at 207 (stating that greater "benefit... would result
from reform by nations whose policies toward investment are not in conformity with the
agreement... [S]uch nations... are not currently OECD members").
280. See, e.g., Geist, supra note 39, 688 (recognizing that the United States permits en-
try to nearly all inward FDI and does not subject FDI proposals to review unless the MNE
seeks to invest in an industry related to defense or national security). But see Exon-Florio
Amendment to the 1988 Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170
(1994) (granting the executive the power to deny an inward FDI proposal on the grounds
that it threatens national security).
281. See supra Part LC (discussing host developing country investment measures and
performance requirements).
282. At a meeting of developing countries in New Delhi, India in September 1996, 13
developing countries expressed opposition to comprehensive investment talks in the WTO:
Bangladesh, Cuba, Egypt Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Tanzania,
Thailand, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. See 13 Developing Nations Oppose Im'estment Pact,
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agreement,"' qualified the prospects for the initiation of negotiations. On invest-
ment, the Singapore Declaration stated that the establishment of the working group
on investment "shall not prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the fu-
ture" and that negotiations will only begin after an "explicit consensus deci-
sion."2"4 Nonetheless, most developed countries continue to believe that such an
agreement is necessary,"' and these countries will push for the working group to
TImEs OF INDIA, Oct. 1, 1996, at 15. Pakistan and Sri Lanka also conveyed their support for
the stand. See id. Closer to the Singapore Conference, this developing country coalition had
decreased in number to include only Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Tan-
zania. See Frances Williams, WTO Push for Investment Rules Pact: Developing Countries
Divided Despite Ruggiero 's Assertion of a 'Compelling Case, 'FIN. TiviEs, Oct. 17, 1996, at
4; Frances Williams, USMayBlock WTO Draft, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1996, at 6.
The opening statements from trade ministers from these developing countries highlight
their concerns over the inclusion of investment negotiations on the WTO agenda. See, e.g.,
World Trade Organization Secretariat, India: Statement by Dr. B.B. Ramaiah, Minister of
Commerce, WT/MIN(96)/ST/27 (Ministerial Conference Dec. 9, 1996) [hereinafter India's
Singapore Conference Statement] (questioning the WTO's competence in the area of in-
vestment and suggesting that the U.N. Conference on Trade & Development (" UNCTAD")
is the more appropriate forum for investment issue discussions); B.B. Ramaiah, Towards a
Multilateral Framework on Investment, TRANSNAT'L CORP., Apr. 1997, at 117 (offering a
revised version of Mr. Ramaiah's speech to the UNCTAD Global Investment Forum in
October 1996); World Trade Organization Secretariat, Indonesia: Statement by H.E. Mr.
Tungky Ariwibowo, Minister of Industry and Trade, WT/MIN(96)IST/22 (Ministerial Con-
ference Dec. 9, 1996) (claiming that the "issue of [a] multilateral framework for investment
is essentially outside the scope and competence of the WTO" and that the WTO should not
"duplicate the work of UNCTAD in this area"); World Trade Organization Secretariat,
Malaysia: Statement by the Honorable Dato' Seri Rafidah Aziz, Minister of International
Trade and Industry, WT/MIN(96)/ST/64 (Ministerial Conference Dec. 11, 1996) (stating
that "Malaysia cannot accept or subscribe to any move towards the formulation of multilat-
eral investment rules in the WTO, although work on an educative process can be supported,
provided it does not lead to a negotiating process").
During the Singapore Conference, however, every country except India and Pakistan had
yielded to pressure by the developed countries on the issue of investment to allow at least
the establishment of a WTO working group on the issue. See Guy de Jonqui~res & Frances
Williams, WTO Close to IT Deal, FIN. TmIEs, Dec. 11, 1996, at 4. By the close of the Sin-
gapore Conference and the final drafting of the Ministerial Declaration, both India and
Pakistan had also yielded to allow the inclusion of language in the Declaration referring to
the establishment of a WTO working group on investment. See Singapore Ministerial Dec-
laration, supra note 2, para. 20.
283. See Anita Gabriel, WTO Process: A Clash of Widely Divergent Agendas, Bus.
TIms (MALAYSIA), Dec. 6, 1996, at 4 (examining the conflicting views of developed and
developing countries on an investment agreement in the WTO).
284. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, para. 20 (qualifying the prospects
for future negotiations on a comprehensive investment agreement).
285. See, e.g., World Trade Organization Secretariat, European Communities, Commis-
sion of the European Communities: Statement by Sir Leon Brittan Q.C., Vice-President of
the European Commission, WT/MIN(96)/ST/2 (Ministerial Conference Dec. 9, 1996) (con-
sidering investment the "top priority for [the] WTO in the years ahead" and asserting that
the establishment of comprehensive multilateral rules on investment in the WTO is of inter-
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lead to negotiations on a comprehensive investment agreement.26
India stands as perhaps the primary obstacle to the commencement of negotia-
tions on direct investment. Although India eventually agreed to the establishment
of a working group on investment, bowing to pressure from developed countries
and the isolation created by the collapse of the developing country coalition,' it
maintains that it will resist the start of any new negotiations on direct investment in
est and benefit to all WTO members and calling for negotiations to begin by the year 2000).
The EU desires that the forthcoming MAI serve as a foundation for a WTO agreement on
direct investment. In the May 1997 draft of the MAY, the EU inserted language to this ef-
fect. See May 1997 MAI Draft, infra note 17, preamble ("Wishing that this Agreement en-
hances international co-operation with respect to investment and the development of world-
wide rules on foreign direct investment in the framework of the world trading system as
embodied in the World Trade Organization."); see also World Trade Organization Secre-
tariat, Japan: Statement by H.E Mr. Yukldhiko Ikeda, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
WT/MIN(96)ST/34 (Ministerial Conference Dec. 10, 1996) (supporting work on invest-
ment in the WTO framework); World Trade Organization Secretariat, United States: State-
ment by the Honourable Charlene Barshefsky, Acting United States Trade Representative,
WTJMIN(96)/ST/5 (Ministerial Conference Dec. 9, 1996) (agreeing to a working group on
investment "as part of a balanced overall agenda for the WTO").
286. See European Commission Proposal on FDI, supra note 1, at 6 (urging the Euro-
pean Community to "actively pursue the establishment of multilateral rules for FDI"). The
report suggests pushing for WTO negotiations on the subject "as soon as possible." L at
13; see also Sir Leon Brittan, Investment Liberalization. The Next Great Boost to the World
Economy, TRANSNAT'L CORP., Apr. 1995, at 1, 9 (asserting that" it would be perverse ... to
claim that truly multilateral rule-making in the investment field would somehow be less ad-
vantageous than multilateral rule-making in the many fields covered by the [Uruguay
Round]."). Brittan suggests that the WTO is the best forum for an agreement on investment
because the WTO membership includes virtually all countries, and WTO rules are binding
and enforceable. See id at 9; see also EU Leads Push for Investment on Post-Singapore
Agenda, EUR. REP., Dec. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Eurrpt File (dis-
cussing the EU proposal for investment talks in the WTO).
287. See Priya Ranjan Dash, India Will Not Compromise on WTO Investment Pact,
TaMs OF INDIA, Dec. 12, 1996, at 13 (reporting that even only a few days before the close
of the Conference, India was maintaining its stand on the investment issue). India stated that
it would not allow even a reference to investment in the Declaration because it believed that
the WTO was not the competent or appropriate forum for negotiations on investment. See
id An Indian trade official stated, "Even if we are isolated [on the decision of including a
reference to investment in the Declaration], it will be splendid isolation. We will not com-
promise our principled stand." Id India eventually did allow the reference to investment
and the establishment of the working group. See India Softens its Stand; Agrees to Include
Labor, TRFMs in Final Pact, Tmms OF INDIA, Dec. 13, 1996, at 13 [hereinafter India Softens
its Stand]; see also supra note 282 (detailing the collapse of the developing country coali-
tion opposed to investment negotiations in the WTO).
Prior to agreeing to the investment reference in the Declaration, India shrewdly suggested
that if the WTO seeks to reduce barriers to investment as distortive of trade, the WTO
should, with equal vigor, look into the trade-distorting effects of national immigration poli-
cies. See Priya Ranjan Dash, India Poses Immigration to Offset Imestment Pact, TmIES OF
INDIA, Dec. 13, 1996, at 13.
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the WTO.288 It views further restrictions on investment measures and policies as an
unacceptable encroachment on host country sovereignty. 89 India points to the
"explicit consensus" principle attached to the investment language in the Declara-
tion and interprets this principle as requiring the unanimous vote of all WTO
member countries before beginning any new negotiations on investment issues.2"
India accepted the Declaration's reference to investment, it claims, only because
the TRIMs Agreement requires review before the year 2000.291 India suggests that
the working group will, therefore, only have the authority to examine the TRIMs
Agreement.292
Realistically, the ability of developed country trade ministers to achieve their
agenda through political maneuvering and a linkage of concessions2 3 will likely
enable the developed countries to set a course for negotiations on direct invest-
288. See Michael Battye, India Declares Victory, But FM is Not Too Happy, TIMES OF
INDIA, Dec. 14, 1996, at 13 (citing Commerce Secretary Tejandra Khanna as declaring that
India will not participate in any consensus for beginning negotiations on investment).
289. See Robert Evans, Trade Ministers Will Face Uphill Task at WTO Meet, TIMES OF
INDIA, Dec. 9, 1996, at 17 (reviewing the new issues on which developed countries arc
seeking to secure negotiating commitments); see also Greenaway, supra note 60, at 377
(asserting that for the WTO system to take up investment measures beyond the scope of
those directly related to trade would be an extension of its competence and scope).
290. See Priya Ranjan Dash, Consensus Principle at WTO is Victory for India, TIMES OF
INDIA, Dec. 16, 1996, at 15 (quoting Indian Commerce Secretary Tejandra Khanna as as-
serting that any single VTO member country will be able, because of the "explicit consen-
sus" language, to block the start of any negotiations on direct investment). Indian trade
ministers suggest that an "explicit consensus" can only be interpreted as requiring a "for-
mal expression of concurrence with a proposal." Id. It is a much more demanding standard
than the simple WTO "consensus" principle, which requires only a "general view" among
WTO member countries. Id.
If an "explicit consensus" is required and if it is interpreted as India suggests, India may
maintain its opposition even in the face of isolation, like it did in the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty talks (" CTBT"). See LS, RS Adjourned: MPs Peeved at 'Volte-Face' in Singa-
pore, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 14, 1996, at 1 (noting that several members of parliament were
upset that India allowed the reference to investment and suggested that India should have
maintained its stand like it did over the signing of the CTBT).
291. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 143, art. 9.
292. See Sunil Jain, Not Out of the Woods Yet, INDIA TODAY, Jan. 15, 1997, at 78-79
(noting that India is under a contractual obligation to participate in a review of the TRIMs
Agreement before the year 2000); see also India Softens its Stand, supra note 287, at 13
(discussing how India would not have accepted the reference to investment had the Decla-
ration characterized direct investment as a "new issue" for the WTO).
293. See Guy de Jonquires, It's a Funny Old World Trade Organization, FIN. TIMEs,
Dec. 12, 1996, at 5. This experienced WTO follower notes:
[Tihe thrill of the game is linkage--trading demands in one area for concessions in another. That
logic apparently dictated the intransigent public stance struck by many developing countries on
contentious issues such as investment.... Such opposition may then be softened in exchange for
movement on, say, agriculture or textiles.
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ment.' The limiting language in the Singapore Declaration will not have its cur-
rent effect in a few years.295 Developed countries will determine the areas where
developing countries will accept concessions' in return for allowing the start of
direct investment negotiations. The TRIMs Agreement, to which many developing
countries were opposed,297 was hammered out in a similar fashion.P
While the Singapore Declaration's reference to comprehensive investment ne-
gotiations in the WTO mandates only negotiations for the establishment of a
working group," both the GATS 0 and TRMhvs' Agreements contain "built-
in ' " authority for review before the year 2000. Developed countries will use this
built-in authority along with the conclusions of the investment working group to
seek the beginning of negotiations on direct investment as early as 1999.
3
294. See Muchkund Dubey, The WVTO and India-If, HINU, Jan. 17, 1997, at 12
(claiming that India will not be able to permanently block the start of new negotiations on
investment and suggesting that India begin formulating a strategy to minimize the loss of
sovereign control over FDI that a new agreement on direct investment would certainly en-
tail); see also C. Rammanohar Reddy, Rich Nations Have Their Way at ITO Meet, HINDU,
Dec. 13, 1996, at 14 (stating that although the language in the Singapore Declaration does
not mandate the immediate start of negotiations on investment, the reference to investment
and the establishment of the working group "is a clear sign that the developed world has
largely got what it wanted").
295. See de Jonqui~res, supra note 293, at 5 (recalling a quote from a trade minister who
stated that the Singapore Declaration will "largely be forgotten by January [1997] and in
five years' time, nobody will be able to recall what all these arguments were about").
296. See, e.g., D. Ravikanth, Issues Before the Singapore Meeting, TIEs OF INDIA, Dec.
9, 1996, at 10 (stating that India and Pakistan, in particular, feel that the VITO has not ade-
quately enforced the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements in textiles and agri-
culture); cf Ariff supra note 145, at 360 (writing during the TRIMs negotiations and sug-
gesting that developing countries can give a little on investment issues if developed
countries give a little on certain trade issues).
297. See supra notes 152-160 and accompanying text (reviewing the positions of devel-
oped and developing countries in the TRIMs negotiation).
298. One can legitimately surmise that most of the liberalization achieved to date
through the GATT/WTO system has been achieved through a strategy of conces-
sion/demand linkage.
299. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, para. 20.
300. See GATS Agreement, supra note 119, pt. IlI, art. XIX.
301. See TRIMs Agreement supra note 143, art. 9.
302. See Singapore Declaration, supra note 2, para. 20 (referring to the "built-in"
agenda of the GATS and TRIMs Agreements).
303. The next VTO ministerial meeting will occur on May 18-20, 1993 in Geneva,
Switzerland. See Next WTO Ministerial on 18-20 May 1998, WTO Focus (World Trade
Organization, Geneva, Switzerland), June-July 1997, at 1, 1. The conclusions of the in-
vestment working group will be presented at that time. See The Growing Impact oflm'est-
ment and Trade, WTO Focus oVorld Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland), June-July
1997, at 2, 2 (highlighting the discussions of the first meeting (June 2-3, 1997) of the
Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment). Negotiations for a
WTO agreement on direct investment could feasibly begin immediately thereafter. The
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B. ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WTO NEGOTIATIONS
ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
1. Is an Agreement on Direct Investment in the WTO Necessary and
Desirable?
In an effort to attract greater inflows of FDI, most developing countries have
individually taken recent steps to liberalize their investment regimes."° Even India
has begun to liberalize its investment policies by increasing the allowable percent-
age of foreign equity ownership for FDI in many sectors..5 and publishing the re-
view criteria of its administrative screening process in an effort to make its policies
more transparent.3" This unilateral liberalization by developing countries has oc-
curred despite the absence of a comprehensive multilateral investment agree-
ment." 7 This trend begs the question of whether a comprehensive multilateral in-
MAI will be concluded around the time of the 1998 WVTO Ministerial Conference and will
undoubtedly become a reference in WTO negotiations. See MAI May 1997 Report, supra
note 15, annex (resolving to complete the MAI before the May 1998 OECD Ministerial
Meeting); The Move Toward Global Rules on Investment: An Interview with Alan P. Lar-
son, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, ECON. PERSP. Apr.
1997, at 6, 6 (available in portable document format (pdf) at <http://www.usia.gov/joumals/
ites/0497/ijee/ijee0497.htm>) (suggesting that the "OECD exercise" provides a model for
future WTO negotiations); Daniel M. Price, The Benefits of a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, ECON. PERSP. Apr. 1997, at 13, 15 (available in portable document format (pdf)
at <http://www.usia.gov/journals/ites/0497/ijee/ijee0497.htm>) ("The essential next step is
to broaden MAI membership through accession and eventually to incorporate its rules into
an agreement within the framework of the WTO.").
304. See Graham, supra note 20, at 206 (noticing a shift toward greater liberalization in
the investment policies of developing countries). Developing nations, who twenty years ago
viewed MNE investment as imperialistic, now actively compete for investment in their
economies and have liberalized their investment policies in an effort to attract greater
amounts of FDI. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 62, at 421 (asserting that "for the
most part, countries now exert greater efforts in attracting FDI than they do in constraining
investors" ).
305. See Mark Nicholson, India Expands Scope of Foreign Investment, FIN. TIMEs, Jan.
22, 1997, at 6 (reporting that India has increased the allowable foreign equity stake to 100%
in transportation, tourism, oil, and power projects; 49% in telecommunications projects;
51% in the pharmaceutical industry; and 20% in the banking sector). The Indian Govern-
ment also broadened the list of sectors in which FDI proposals of up to 74% foreign owner-
ship do not require administrative screening. See id.
306. See Aiming for Transparency: New Guidelines Address Problems Faced by For-
eign Investors, INDIA TODAY, Feb. 15, 1997, at 64, 64 (stating that the Foreign Investment
Promotion Board made its entry acceptance criteria publicly available for the first time).
307. See Americo Beviglia Zampetti & Pierre Sauvd, Onwards to Singapore: The Inter-
national Contestability of Markets and the New Trade Agenda, 19 WORLD ECON. 333, 333
(1996) (noting that countries have exhibited an increased desire to liberalize FDI regimes as
part of the general integration of the world economy).
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vestment agreement is necessary or even desirable at this point in timeAc3 Negotia-
tions would give interest groups an opportunity to frustrate liberalization efforts
and request carve-outs and other exceptions, and the level of liberalization in the
resulting agreement could actually be negative 3
An agreement is desirable, however, for a number of reasons. Although devel-
oping countries have begun to liberalize their investment regimes, this liberaliza-
tion has been only partial. Furthermore, without an underlying standstill or roll-
back obligation of a multilateral investment agreement, this modest liberalization
can be easily reversed."' A truly multilateral agreement on foreign direct invest-
ment in the WTO,3 1 therefore, would, at a minimum, lock-in the current levels of
liberalization. For this result alone, an agreement is desirable.
In addition, by eliminating investment-distorting measures, a WVTO investment
agreement will generate a net gain in world welfare."' Those in favor of an
agreement on direct investment emphasize the net world welfare gain that such an
agreement would generate" Those opposed focus on the potential welfare loss to
308. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 62, at 430 & n.40 (asking "If it ain't broken,
why fix it?").
309. See id at 422.
310. See Graham, supra note 20, at 208 (suggesting that a multilateral agreement can
prevent "policy backsliding").
311. See WTO Report, supra note 20, at 59 (asserting that "[o]nly a multilateral nego-
tiation in the WVTO ... can provide [the necessary] global and balanced framework" for an
investment agreement); GRAHAM, supra note 101, at 102 (positing that the NVTO is the
preferable forum because the VTO membership includes most countries of the world and
will likely also include China).
312. See Bergsten & Graham, supra note 76, at 24-25, 27-28 (viewing the world system
from the perspective of world economic welfare maximization). Even if investment meas-
ures give the host developing country a better share of the benefits of lANE investment,
some party must assume the cost of the investment measure. See id. at 27-28. Investment
barriers drive MNEs away from the host country, and this reduces the optimization of world
capital resources. See id at 24. Game theory suggests that the only way to force host coun-
tries to remove investment barriers and incentives to achieve a maximum net welfare gain is
to prohibit the investment measures and incentives through an enforceable set of rules. See
id. at 28-29. Only under an enforceable system of rules, whereby the certain punishment for
breaking the rules is enough to deter cheating on the agreement in the hopes of securing
individual benefits, can every country "win" from the arrangement. See Id.
313. See Brewer & Young, supra note 119, at 79 (recognizing net welfare gains from
international agreements because they reduce investors' uncertainty over the investment
environment); McCulloch, supra note 56, at 552 (asserting that an agreement, in whatever
forum, prohibiting all "efficiency-robbing" investment measures is necessary); Renato
Ruggiero, Foreign Direct Investment and the Multilateral Trading System, TRANSAT'L
CORP., Apr. 1996, at 1, 7 (asserting that the negotiation of investment rules in the VTO
should not revolve around a North/South debate because it is in the interests of all countries
to create a more secure international environment for direct investment); see also Low &
Subramanian, supra note 62, at 422-23 (offering a list of six reasons why a comprehensive
multilateral agreement on investment is desirable to the world economy); Zampetti &
Sauvd, supra note 307, at 340-41 (positing that the completion of a comprehensive agree-
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their own economies.3?14 In an international system still dominated by political con-
cerns, pure welfare maximization is not possible, and political concerns will pre-
vent a welfare maximizing agreement on direct investment." 5 In WTO negotia-
tions on direct investment, therefore, negotiators will have to achieve a balancing
of interests and a trade-off of benefits. There are a number of issues that will be-
come central to this balancing of interests in WTO negotiations on direct invest-
ment.
2. Reconstituting the MAI in the WTO Framework
Because the MAI promises to be the most comprehensive and the most liberal-
izing multilateral investment agreement in existence, it will figure prominently in
negotiations at the WTO.3 6 Although the provisions and principles of the MAI
will significantly influence negotiations in the WTO framework, 7 it is not practi-
cable for WTO negotiators to simply impose the MAI on all WTO member coun-
tries."' Developed countries are negotiating the MAI, 9 and the MAI, conse-
quently, accommodates developed country concerns. The MAI provisions
represent the interests and desired liberalization levels of developed countries.
Developing countries are not economically or politically prepared for the rapid
liberalization and almost complete relinquishment of sovereign control over FDI
required by the MAI. Negotiators will need to accommodate these developing
ment on direct investment in the WTO would provide "one-stop shopping" benefits). The
horizontal development of WVTO rules in goods, services, and investment will increase
transparency and reduce transaction costs. See id.
314. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text (discussing developing country con-
cerns over the unequal distribution of benefits from an MNE investment). But see Zampetti
& Sauvd, supra note 307, at 333-34 (asserting that developing countries have an equal stake
in the establishment of multilateral investment rules to promote efficiency and that such an
exercise is a logical development given the increasing integration of the world economy).
315. See supra notes 293-298 and accompanying text (describing the de-
mand/concession trade-offs in WTO negotiations).
316. See supra Part IV.C (analyzing the benefits of the MAI agreement).
317. See The Move Toward Global Rules on Investment: An Interview with Alan P. Lar-
so4 Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, supra note 304, at 6
(suggesting that the "OECD exercise" provides a model for future WTO negotiations);
Daniel M. Price, supra note 304, at 15 ("The essential next step is to broaden MAI mem-
bership through accession and eventually to incorporate its rules into an agreement within
the framework of the WTO."); cf 1996 MAI Progress Report, supra note 224, at 4 (noting
that the WTO is a permanent observer in the MAI Negotiating Group).
318. Even the OECD admits that it is not practicable for the MAI to be imposed on
members of the WTO. See Ley, supra note 211, at 30 ("The MAI would no doubt be an
important reference for WTO negotiations.... But any WTO agreement would have to be
designed for the WTO membership and in the framework of WTO disciplines and institu-
tional arrangements."); cf Graham, supra note 20, at 215 & n.17 (arguing that because the
MAI was negotiated by developed countries in the OECD framework, WTO countries will
distrust the MAI because they did not participate in its negotiation).
319. See supra note 205 (listing the 29 OECD member countries).
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country concerns in any WTO agreement.32 Consequently, the MAI should only
be used as a reference agreement. It is not a practical model for a multilateral
agreement in the WTO.
321
One option, however, that would allow the MAI's provisions of "high stan-
dards" to remain intact in the WTO framework is for the MAI signatories to re-
constitute the MAI in the WVTO as a plurilateral agreement" and, subsequently,
seek to gain the participation of a number of non-OECD membersP3 This ap-
proach would maintain the MAI's "high standards" of investment liberalization
and investment protection. The resulting plurilateral agreement, however, would
not include the majority of countries, and its ultimate value to the international
system would be minimal because of the limited number of participants.324 Nego-
tiators could seek the progressive addition of countries to the plurilateral agree-
ment and, therefore, pursue a gradual process of multilateral liberalization. Devel-
oped countries, however, seek a more immediately inclusive and a more rapidly
negotiated agreement?' A progressively enlarged WVTO plurilateral agreement
would not meet these developed country objectives. The ultimate role of the MAI
in NVTO negotiations, therefore, should only be one of useful reference for multi-
lateral negotiations.
3. Incorporating Rules on Restrictive MNE Practices
To achieve a meaningful multilateral investment agreement and to secure the
active participation of developing countries, WVTO negotiators should take a bal-
anced approach, seeking to understand the positions of both developed and devel-
oping countries on the issue of direct investment. As part of this balanced ap-
320. Cf Salacuse, supra note 27, at 989 ('In general, Western governments have not
shown great understanding of the reasons for [investment measures] and barriers, nor have
they sought to accommodate the legitimate concerns of the Third Vorld.').
321. Cf Brittan, supra note 286, at 9-10 (suggesting a two-track approach to the nego-
tiation of investment rules: the OECD MAI and separately in the \VTO).
322. A WVTO plurilateral agreement is an agreement covered under the VTO system and
subject to VTO rules, including dispute settlement, but without the participation of all
WVTO members. See Robertson, supra note 208, at 81 (suggesting that the MAI and the
Uruguay Round TRIMs Agreement can be reconciled by making the MAI a VTO plurilat-
eral agreement); see Graham, supra note 20, at 209 (asserting that OECD countries did not
have to negotiate a stand-alone agreement to achieve their goal of "high standards"). The
MAI could have been negotiated as a plurilateral 1VTO agreement. See id Graham suggests
that if at least one non-OECD country had joined such a plurilateral VTO agreement it
would have been an improvement over the OECD MAI. See id at 209, 216-17.
323. Cf Zampetti & Sauvd, supra note 307, at 340 (believing that "novel rule-making
initiatives at the plurilateral lever'--specifically reconstituting the MAI in the WVTO-
should not be avoided because of a lack of multilateral participation).
324. Cf id (asserting that there is an "economy of scale in rulemaking" which is
achieved when an agreement includes the greatest number of countries possible).
325. See supra notes 285-290 and accompanying text (offering statements from devel-
oped country trade ministers who seek comprehensive investment rules as soon as possible).
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proach, negotiations should include the extension of WTO rules to cover the prac-
tices of MNEs. Developing countries cite restrictive MNE practices as the primary
reason for the imposition of investment measures.326 Developing countries argue
that MNE practices result in a lopsided allocation of FDI benefits and hamper de-
velopment objectives. 7 Any WTO agreement that removes important develop-
ment policy tools-investment measures-without remedying the underlying
problem for which the tools are employed-restrictive MNE practices-will not
obtain the support of developing countries. Thus, bringing MNE practices under
the jurisdiction of the WTO system is a necessary and natural evolution for the
WTO system if it hopes to significantly advance the liberalization of direct in-
vestment.
An extension of the WTO's rules to cover MNEs would be a noteworthy devel-
opment in the evolution of the WTO system.32 The GATT/WTO system regulates
only products, not actors.329 Its obligations apply only to governments, not firms.
The GATT, however, never dealt with investment issues;3 it only covered trade
issues. The extension of the WTO system in the Uruguay Round to cover invest-
ment issues33 was, itself, a radical development because the economic effects of
and political sensitivities to foreign direct investment in host countries are far
greater than the effects of trade.332 If developed countries earnestly desire compre-
hensive investment rules in the WTO, then they must be prepared to discuss the
chief impediment to an agreement on such rules-uncontrolled MNE practices.
In negotiating rules covering MNE practices negotiators should adhere to the
mandate of the Singapore Declaration and cooperate with the United Nations Con-
326. See supra notes 44-85 and accompanying text (discussing the potential costs of FDI
to developing countries and the use of investment measures to control these costs).
327. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing the policy role of devel-
oping country investment measures).
328. GATT actually did consider the issue of MNE practices shortly after its inception.
See Resolution of Nov. 5, 1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 29 (1959) (recognizing that
the "activities of [MNEs] may hamper the expansion of world trade and economic devel-
opment in individual countries and thereby frustrate the benefits of tariff reductions and the
removal of quantitative restrictions or otherwise interfere with the objectives of the General
Agreement."). The Group of Experts set up to examine the practices of MNEs, however,
concluded that an agreement regulating MNE practices was unacceptable at that time. See
Restrictive Business Practices: Arrangements for Consultations, June 2, 1960, GATT
B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 170-71 (1961). The GATT Contracting Parties settled for an ar-
rangement that allowed individual government-to-government consultations regarding
harmful MNE practices. See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFs & TRADE, THE AcTivrrs
OF GATT 1960/61 29-30 (1961).
329. See Christy, supra note 50, at 743.
330. See discussion supra Part II (tracing the evolution of GATT coverage of direct in-
vestment issues, including the addition of investment rules in the GATS and TRIMs
Agreements of the WTO).
33 1. See supra Part II.B.2 (analyzing the TRIMs Agreement).
332. See supra Part I.B (examining the benefits and costs of FDI to developing econo-
mies).
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ference on Trade and Development C'UNCTAD"). 333 UNCTAD's work includes
instruments that essentially encapsulate the positions of developing countries on
the regulation of MNEs. 34 Negotiators should also look to the OECD instrument
covering the practices of MINEsP' as a set of guidelines reflecting developed
country positions on the issue. Only through a genuine understanding of both de-
veloped and developing country positions on the regulation of MNE practices can
negotiations in the WTO achieve meaningful rules in this area. Coverage of INE
practices is a prerequisite, or at least a co-requisite, to any comprehensive WTO
investment agreement.
4. Extent of Liberalization
Any agreement in the WTO will not match the comprehensiveness or liberali-
zation levels of the MAI. It is simply an unattainable goal for the time being, given
the greater number of countries and views in the WTO and, in particular, the con-
cerns of developing countries to FDI liberalization 6 When negotiations on direct
investment begin at the WTO, negotiators will have to determine how far the
agreement should advance the modest liberalization of the GATS and TRIMs
Agreements.33 Whether rules covering NINE practices are included in the negotia-
tions will determine the ultimate extent of possible liberalization. If MNE practices
are covered, then developing countries will be more inclined to negotiate greater
liberalization obligations and greater investment protection provisions. If INE
practices are not covered, then the level of liberalization, at least initially, will be
minimal.
The objective of WTO negotiations should initially be to produce "good stan-
dards." The objective should be to negotiate an agreement that advances the WTO
coverage of investment yet with a minimum of exceptions and country-specific
reservations. The "high standards" of the MAP3" should be a longer-term goal.
333. See Singapore Declaration, supra note 2, para. 20 (espousing a desire to cooperate
with UNCTAD in the framework of the working group on investment).
334. See THE SET OF MULTILATERALLY AGREED EQUITABLE PRINCIPLEs AND THE RULES
FOR THE CONTROL OF REsnucrivE BusiNss PRActnCEs, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10,
U.N. Sales No. E.81.TI.D.5 (1981), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 813 (1980); U.N. CM. ON
TRANSNATIONAL CORP., THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.86.II.A.15 (1986). The Code of Conduct has not been
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, and efforts to obtain its adoption were largely
abandoned in 1992. Julius, supra note 196, at 278.
335. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRisEs (1994).
336. See supra notes 44-85 and accompanying text (discussing the potential costs of FDI
to developing countries and the use of investment measures to control these costs).
337. See Part H.B.1-2 (examining the GATS and TRIMs Agreements, their benefits, and
their limitations).
338. See supra note 211 and discussion Part III.B (explaining what is meant by the
OECD's stated goal of "high standards" and summarizing the likely provisions of the
MAI).
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The WTO, therefore, should take a gradual approach to the liberalization of direct
investment.339 Hurried negotiations or negotiations that do not adequately reflect
the concerns of developing countries risk producing an agreement that is riddled
with exceptions and reservations and, therefore, of little real value to the interna-
tional economic system.
WTO negotiators should begin by confining investment negotiations around an
enterprise-based definition of investment,34 covering MNE subsidiaries and other
tangible investments in a host country. Future investment negotiations can broaden
the definition of investment so as to extend the liberalization commitments applied
to tangible investments to less tangible forms of investment such as intellectual
property assets.
As part of the mandated five-year TRIMs evaluation, negotiators should include
export performance requirements in the list of prohibited trade-distorting meas-
ures. An export performance requirement is a trade-distorting measure that should
have been included in the original TRIMs prohibitions.34' The initial focus of in-
vestment negotiations should then be on incrementally extending WTO coverage
to the more encompassing set of investment-distorting investment measures. The
agreement should initially employ a positive list approach,34 prohibiting only
those measures specifically listed in the agreement. In the future, after successive
agreements to eliminate the bulk of investment measures, negotiators can draft a
new agreement subjecting all investment measures to the principles of national
treatment and most-favored nation treatment under a negative list approach. De-
veloping countries, however, are not prepared to relinquish complete control over
investment policy in the initial investment negotiations.
Finally, to prevent redundancy and to promote the manageability of WTO rules,
the FDI provisions of both the GATS and TRIMs Agreements 4' should be lifted
from the two Agreements and incorporated into the new investment agreement.
339. Cf. Julius, supra note 196, at 274 (stating that "[t]he necessarily voluntary nature
of any regime that is compatible with national sovereignty means that universality can only
be approached incrementally. Coverage will expand only as countries perceive the net bene-
fits of participation."); cf also Goldberg & Kindleberger, supra note 34, at 322 (writing in
1970 the authors argue that a giant step to create a comprehensive investment agreement is
unwise). The authors suggest an agreement on fundamental principles which would pro-
gressively grow deeper. See id. It is important to note that part of the reason for the failure
of the International Trade Organization was that it sought an immediate agreement on ad-
vanced levels of liberalization. See id.
340. But cf supra notes 216-219 and accompanying text (discussing how the MAI will
employ the more encompassing asset-based definition of investment).
341. See Low & Subramanian, supra note 62, at 421 (explaining that export subsidies,
which are closely related to export performance requirements, are already prohibited by
GATT rules).
342. Cf Francq, supra note 218, at 15 (asserting that the MAI will employ a negative
list approach).
343. See supra Parts II.B.1-2 (analyzing the FDI provisions in the GATS and TRIMs
Agreements).
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GATS will remain as a trade in services agreement and the TRIMs Agreement can
be discarded. The WTO can then focus on progressively adding further liberaliza-
tion commitments to the investment agreement and broadening the scope of its
coverage with the goal of some day achieving the comprehensiveness and level of
liberalization of the MAI.
CONCLUSION
Although an initial agreement on direct investment in the WVTO will not meas-
ure up to the comprehensiveness and level of liberalization of the MAI, the general
prospects for an agreement on direct investment in the VTO are favorable, at least
for an agreement that advances the modest liberalization of the GATS and TRIMs
Agreements. Developing country attitudes toward FDI have changed since the end
of the Uruguay Round and many now actively pursue direct investment. Develop-
ing countries, however, still have concerns over restrictive MNE practices and di-
minished control over national development.
Developed country negotiators should make a sincere effort to understand and
incorporate the concerns of developing countries into NVTO investment discussions
rather than rushing to secure an investment agreement or simply trying to impose
their MAI "high standards" on developing countries. Hasty and one-sided nego-
tiations produce agreements riddled with exceptions and reservations and, there-
fore, of little real value to the international economic system. The development of
WTO investment rules should be gradual and should include the incorporation of
rules covering MNE practices. Only through developed-developing country coop-
eration and a reciprocal understanding of concerns will VTO negotiations for an
agreement on direct investment yield the quality instrument that all parties desire.
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